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Journal of Development Economics, 144(May), 2020. 
David Ong, Yu (Alan) Yang, and Junsen Zhang 
Reports of the difficulties of elite women in finding suitable mates have been 
increasing despite the growing availability and value of men in China. We 
rationalize this “leftover women” phenomenon within the directed/competitive 
search framework, which uniquely allows for equilibrium crowding out. Within 
this framework, we show that the leftover women phenomenon can be the result 
of women’s aversion to men who have a lower income than themselves (hereafter, 
ALM) and the long-predicted complementarity between women’s non-market 
traits (in particular, beauty) and male earnings. For high-income (h-)women, 
even when high-income (H-)men are more plentiful and richer, the direct effect 
of the greater number of desirable men can be overwhelmed by the indirect effect 
of competitive ‘entry’ by low-income (l-)women, particularly, the beautiful. We 
test for these competitive search effects using online dating field experimental, 
Census, and household survey data. Consistent with the competitive entry of l-
women, when sex ratio and H-men’s income increase, the search intensity of 
beautiful l-women for H-men increases. In response to this competitive entry, 
plain h-women, who are constrained by their ALM to search predominantly for 
H-men, also increase their search intensity. However, only their marriage 
probability decreases. Our evidence is consistent with intra-female competitive 
search for spouses who can cover the labor market opportunity cost of marriage 
and childbirth, which increases with a woman’s income. 
JEL Codes: C93, J01, J12 
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Reports in the popular press (Fincher, 2012) and in the academic literature (Qian & Qian, 
2014) of the difficulties of “leftover” elite women in finding suitable mates have been 
increasing, despite the growing scarcity of marriageable women in China (Jiang, Feldman, & 
Li, 2014). This scarcity is partly the consequence of one of the most radical family planning 
experiments in history. Initiated in 1979, the one-child policy has resulted in hundreds of 
million fewer births in China. Owing to the traditional Chinese preference for sons, this 
decrease in births has not been equally distributed; at least 30 million women are now missing 
from the prime-age marriage market. 
One might have supposed that the surviving women can only benefit from their scarcity. 
Indeed, this outcome is predicted by established economic theory; the short side of the mating 
market should enjoy a greater probability of matching and more surplus from their presumably 
greater bargaining power (Becker, 1973). Moreover, when women are scarce, men should 
compete harder to increase their mate value. Positive assortative matching predicts that high-
income women, in particular, benefit when the income of high-income men increases. 
However, we show conceptually, through simulation, and empirically that if women are averse 
to a lower-income man (hereafter, ALM), then high-income women can be crowded out of the 
marriage market by lower income women when there are more men or when men are richer. 
Such an aversion is suggested by Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely’s (2010b) empirical study 
with US online dating data showing that women tend not to send first-contact emails to men 
who earn more than $20,000 less than themselves. Ong and Wang (2015) find that Chinese 
women have a similar aversion to a lower income men with an online dating field experiment 
with random assignment of income to male and female online dating profiles in China.1 These 
revealed aversion findings with online daters are corroborated by Bertrand, Kamenica, and 
Pan’s (2015) study showing that married couples “avoid” the situation where the husband earns 
less than the wife with US household survey data.2 Men on the other hand are either indifferent 
to women’s income (Goussé, Jacquemet, & Robin, 2018; Ong & Wang, 2015) or have a weaker 
preference than women for men’s (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, & Ariely, 2010a). We outline a standard 
microeconomic basis for the gender difference in preference for mate income and women’s 
 
1
 See Appendix 1 for the graphs of their main results. 
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 See Appendix 2, where we replicate a key result in their paper of a discontinuous drop in the share of marriages when the wife’s income 
exceeds that of her husband with Chinese Census data. 
2 
 
ALM in the literature review and conceptual framework sections. Here, we limit the discussion 
to an intuitive explanation. 
The key insight of the comparative statics implications which we test in this study is that, 
with an ALM for mate income, increases in a woman’s income reduce the pool of the men she 
finds attractive, while expanding the pool of other women who might prefer these same men. 
In the context of an ALM for mate income, the fierceness of the competition a woman faces 
for the men she most prefers ‘escalates’ as her income increases. The main focus of this present 
study is how this escalation in competition can, moreover, be exacerbated by increases in the 
income and availability of high-income men. Either may boost the expected return of pursuing 
such men: the former increases the value and the latter increases the probability of getting such 
a man.  
The direct effect of increases in the income and the availability of high-income men benefit 
high-income women. In the case of increases in men’s income, men are more desirable. In the 
case of increases in the local sex ratio (number of men/number of women in a city), more high-
income men are available for each woman to desire. In either case, the higher ex-ante expected 
return for pursuing these high-income men may also increase the number of low-income 
women (particularly the beautiful among them) who might switch from pursuing low-income 
men to pursuing these high-income men as well.  
Accordingly, an indirect effect of both increases in the income and availability of high-
income men is the increased ‘entry’ of low-income women into the matching market for high-
income men. As a result, high-income women, who are averse to matching with low-income 
men due to their ALM, are worse off in the marriage market. The indirect effect is likely to 
dominate the direct effect for high-income women, whereas the opposite is true for low-income 
women, who can also be satisfied with matching with low-income men, for whom they are not 
in competition with high-income women.  
Consequently, high-income women can on balance be worse off in terms of marriage 
probability relative to low-income women or even in absolute terms when high-income men 
are even richer or more plentiful as a result of this ‘competitive entry’ of low-income women 
into the market for high-income men. Such may be the situation in China, where both the sex 
ratio and men’s income compared with women’s have been increasing dramatically (Ge & 
Yang, 2014). While our key finding that high-income women are less likely to match when 
there are more men to match with seems incompatible with Becker’s (1973) theory of sex ratio, 
we show that it can, in actuality, be explained by the recent theory of directed or competitive 
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search which builds on Becker’s work. We discuss our results in terms of this literature at 
length in Section III Conceptual Framework. 
We exploit variation in the local sex ratio and the incomes of men across Chinese cities to 
test for our competitive entry hypothesis. We use three datasets: field experimental data with 
random assignment of income, the Chinese Census, and the China Family Panel Studies 
(CFPS) household survey data, which contains beauty ratings of those surveyed. The local sex 
ratio of a city in a certain age range can be regarded as representing the ex-ante prospects for 
each side of finding a marriage or remarriage partner, and thus, as a measure of the 
competitiveness of the mating market (Becker, 1973). For the online dating field experiment, 
we chose 15 major cities for the variation they exhibit in local sex ratios and measured the 
variation across these different types of women’s relative search intensities for men with 
different income levels. In this experiment, we randomly assigned three income levels to 450 
fictitious male profiles on a large online dating-for-marriage website and recorded the incomes 
and other characteristics of 1,811 ‘visits’ from women to these male profiles. The female 
visitors were divided into high-, medium-, and low-income levels. Moreover, we also had a 
random sample of nearly two-thirds of these female visitors’ profile photo rated for their 
beauty.  
Consistent with our competitive entry hypothesis, we show that the search intensity of the 
beautiful low-income women for high-income men increases with the local sex ratio and the 
income of high-income men. Consistent with substitution towards low-income men in the face 
of greater competition for high-income men, the search intensity of the plain-looking among 
the low-income women for high-income men also decreases with the local sex ratio and the 
income of high-income men. In contrast, consistent with a binding ALM, the search intensity 
of high-income women—in particular, the plain-looking among them—for the high-income 
men increases (though at a lower rate than the beautiful low-income women) with the local sex 
ratio and the income of these high-income men.  
Our analysis of the Chinese Census data finds the expected ultimate consequence of the 
increased entry of beautiful low-income women into the market for high-income men. High-
income women’s probability of marriage decreases relative to that of low-income women as 
the local sex ratio and the income of high-income men increase, notwithstanding the increase 
in these women’s search intensity for these men. By contrast, low-income women’s marriage 
probability weakly increases with the local sex ratio and on the income of high-income men, 
despite their average (averaging over their beauty) search intensity for these men not increasing 
with either. Although the negative effect of men’s mean income on high-income women’s 
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probability of marriage may in part be due also to these men’s marginal utility for beauty 
increasing with their income, we can find no alterative explanation for the negative effect of 
the sex ratio on high-income women’s probability of marriage relative to that of low-income 
women, especially in the context of the generally accepted assumption of positive assortative 
matching of spouses on income. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis of competitive entry 
by beautiful low-income women into the market for high-income men, the CFPS data suggest 
that it is the plain-looking high-income women’s probability of marriage which decreases not 
only relative to plain-looking low-income women but also in absolute terms as the local sex 
ratio increases. In contrast, the probability of marriage of the beautiful high-income women 
weakly increases relative to beautiful low-income women.  
We also find evidence supporting prior findings that rising male wage inequality is a 
significant contributor to women delaying their marriage (Gould & Paserman, 2003).3 To take 
this into account, we control for the mean and standard deviation of men’s income in all 
regressions. Given these controls, we show with Census data that only high-income women 
experience a decreased marriage rate when high-income men’s income increases, while low-
income women’s marriage rate increases. We provide an additional treatment variable, the 
local sex ratio, which we show contributes to the divergence of marriage rates among women 
of different income levels with Census data and among different income and beauty levels with 
household survey data. We, moreover, provide novel data on the search behavior of women 
and show that this search behavior varies with sex ratio according to the income and beauty 
level of the women, which given our ALM framework, predicts the divergence in marriage 
rates we find with Census and household survey data.  
Our findings would be less surprising if the deterioration in the marital prospects of high-
income women can be attributed to the cross-border migration of brides from low-income 
regions (Weiss, Yi, & Zhang, 2019). In fact, significant internal migration has occurred within 
China in recent years. However, because the local sex ratio includes the migrant population, 
the greater influx of low-income women migrants, which reduces the sex ratio, cannot be the 
driving factor for the association between a higher sex ratio and the decreased rate of marriage 
among high-income women. Moreover, the sex ratio is controlled for when we find that high-
income women are adversely affected by increases in the income of high-income men.  
 
3
 Despite the novelty of our findings for high-income women, our empirical results support standard theories – when we average across 
women of all income levels and beauty. Consistent with more outside-options from the greater availability of men, the marriage probability 
of women on average increases with sex ratio. 
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II. Background and Related Literature 
We build on Hitsch et al.’s (2010a) framework for analyzing first-contact email behavior to 
reveal user mate preferences. As they point out, the Gale-Shapley model, in particular, the 
deferred-acceptance algorithm approximates the behavior of online daters in their exchanges 
of signals of interest and emails if the search frictions they face are negligible. Hitsch et al. 
(2010a) show that preferences revealed in the online dating context are correlated with 
preferences revealed in actual marriages. We focus on the click-throughs of dating profiles on 
preliminary search results, which are prior to and necessary for making first-contact emails. 
Within the expected utility framework of our analysis, women’s reaction to a given 
combination of match probability and match payoff associated with a male profile would vary 
with their preferences. Therefore, different reactions (here, click-throughs) among agents to a 
given profile would reflect both the variation in the probability of matching and the underlying 
preference of the woman for the match. For a fixed probability of matching, we can infer the 
woman’s preferences using click-through rates. 
Within our directed search framework, women’s visit rate depends on both the women’s 
preference for the men’s income and the women’s beliefs about their probability of success, 
i.e., on the expected value of the visit to the woman’s income type, in equilibrium. The prior 
work of Ong and Wang shows that all types of women tend to visit the scarcer high-income 
men (with whom they can expect a lower probability of success) with higher frequency within 
a given city with a fixed sex ratio. From this result, we infer that all income types of women 
prefer these high-income men and have an aversion to the more plentiful low-income men that 
is increasing on the women’s income.  
In this paper, we assume that women’s ALM is constant across cities given that we controlled 
for individual characteristics of the female visitors and city-specific characteristics: the mean 
and variance of men’s and women’s income. Holding other factors (especially men’s mean 
income) constant, we, therefore, can interpret that the increase in visits to the high-income male 
profiles when sex ratio increases as being due to the women’s anticipation of an increased rate 
of success. In our experiment, we focus on the variation in the probability of individual 
women’s visits to our male profiles across 15 cities due to changes in the sex ratio and the mean 
income of high-income men.  
Our conceptual framework of escalating competition is similar to other theories in predicting 
that women’s marriage rate decreases with their income (Isen & Stevenson, 2010) or 
educational attainment (Boulier & Rosenzweig, 1984). Recent research has focused on the 
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potential effect of social norms in the US (Bertrand et al., 2015), Asia (excluding China) 
(Hwang, 2016), and other developed countries (Bertrand, Cortes, Olivetti, & Pan, 2018). We 
too do find women’s marital prospects decrease with their educational attainment,4 but not with 
income, once educational attainment is controlled for. However, entirely different from the 
prior literature, we examine the comparative statics effect of the local sex ratio and men’s 
income on the search intensity and the probability of marriage of high- and low-income women.  
Our study is closely related to but still differs significantly from the burgeoning literature on 
the effect of the local sex ratio on the competition for mates, particularly in China. Evidence 
exists for the expected increase in competition among men or their supporting families and the 
relaxation of competition among women. The rise in the local sex ratio predicts increases in 
men’s level of entrepreneurship (Yuan, Rong, & Xu, 2012), men’s work hours in dangerous 
and risky jobs (Wei & Zhang, 2011), male criminal activities (Edlund, Li, Yi, & Zhang, 2013), 
the savings of families with sons (Wei & Zhang, 2011), the time men spend on housework 
within households (Du, Wang, & Zhang, 2015), and women’s participation in decision making 
(Edlund et al., 2013). The rise in the local sex ratio also decreases women’s educational 
attainment and employment (Edlund et al., 2013). These studies on outcomes, which focus 
primarily on the behavior of men, confirm Becker’s (1973) theory that the bargaining position 
of women improves as the sex ratio rises.  
The effect of the sex ratio on the competition for mates has been studied in countries other 
than China. For example, consistent with Becker’s theory, Abramizky et al. (2011) find that 
the low sex ratio (from the shortage of men after World War I) led more men to “marry up”. 
That is, the short side of the market benefited from its shortage. Our contribution to this sex 
ratio literature is to test for heterogeneity in the effect of the sex ratio on subgroups of the 
mating market. In contrast to previous studies, we demonstrate that a subgroup of the short side 
of the market (women in our case) was negatively affected by ALM despite their shortage, 
which is the opposite result and contrary to what one might expect based on Becker’s theory 
of marriage-matching. The crucial factor, which to our knowledge has been little explored in 
Becker’s framework, is the consequence of most women’s ex-ante expectation of specialization 
in household production on their search behavior and their odds of matching. 
Women’s ALM itself is a natural consequence of the classical assumption that women 
generally specialize in household production after marriage due to traditional gender roles 
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(Becker, 1973).5 This assumption is fleshed out in, for example, Caucutt et al. (2002), which 
posits that women take up the bulk of the burden of childcare and will marry only if the utility 
from pooled consumption and investment in children in the context of marriage is higher than 
their outside-option of being single (consume and/or raise children using their income). 
With regard to women’s labor market opportunity cost from specialization in household 
production, recent evidence supports the implication that Becker draws from the assumption 
that women specialize in household production after marriage, which is that marriage rates 
would increase with the gender gap in wages because the gap decreases women’s labor market 
opportunity cost from specialization in household production (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2018; 
Shenhav, 2020). Recent evidence also confirms Becker’s prediction that marriage and 
childbirth decrease women’s labor market participation based on the assumption that women 
tend to specialize more than men in household production after marriage. Women in the West 
(Lundberg & Rose, 2000) and in China (Feng, Hu, & Moffitt, 2017; Hare, 2016) often 
relinquish full-time work after marriage and childbirth. Among these women, the more highly 
educated are relatively more likely to “opt-out” completely (Hersch, 2013), possibly because 
their marriage to higher income men makes opting out more affordable (Bertrand, Goldin, & 
Katz, 2010).  
Women’s decreased labor market participation after marriage (Goldin, 2014) , and childbirth 
(Chung, Downs, Sandler, & Sienkiewicz, 2019) in the US Denmark (Kleven, Landais, & 
Søgaard, 2018; Lundborg, Plug, & Rasmussen, 2017), Norway (Andresen & Nix, 2019; 
Bütikofer, Jensen, & Salvanes, 2018), and China (Chen, Zhang, & Zhou, 2018), is the main 
source of gender differences in wages. Furthermore, women anticipate and report preferring 
(Parker & Wang, 2013) decreased labor market participation after marriage and childbirth in 
the US, even before they marry or graduate from college. Women also anticipate a relatively 
higher income husband (Wiswall & Zafar, 2018), who can potentially support their premarital 
standard of living. Correspondingly, men anticipate a lower income wife and no change in 
labor market participation after marriage.  
Couple’s anticipation of asymmetric labor market participation after marriage helps explain 
the asymmetry in preference for mate income revealed in search behavior found in Ong and 
Wang (2015). To the extent that a woman’s income is expected to be forgone after marriage, 
her income will not benefit her potential husband. Men’s apparent lack of income-based 
attraction to women as marriage partners may reflect their anticipation of the women’s loss of 
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 Women’s ALM has also been documented in the large sociological literature on female hypergamy. 
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income. Given women’s likely and anticipated reduction in income after marriage, it is natural 
for them to seek a husband whose income would substantially offset the opportunity cost of 
their potentially decreased labor market participation and specialization in household 
production to maintain their standard of living. 6  We provide a conceptual framework to 
understand and empirical evidence for the intra-gender competition between women resulting 
from their search for such husbands.7 Moreover, we provide evidence consistent with the 
dominance of women’s ALM for a higher income mate over a possible men’s aversion to a 
higher income mate.  
One of the main contributions of our study is to apply the directed search framework to 
marriage matching. Whereas there has been substantial theoretical work on directed search, the 
theoretical and empirical literature on directed search in the marriage market is sparse (Chade, 
Eeckhout, & Smith, 2017; Wright, Kircher, Julien, & Guerrieri, 2019). Among the exceptions 
are Xu and Yang (2016) which develops a search/matching model to analyze targeted search 
in a horizontally differentiated marriage market (where couples match by, e.g., personality). 
Arcidiacono, Beauchamp, and McElroy (2016) analyze the effect of sex ratio in a high school 
on sexual activity using a directed search framework. Few studies in the economics literature 
observe search behavior (Chiappori, Ong, Yang, & Zhang, 2017; Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, 
& Simonson, 2006; Hitsch et al., 2010b; Ong, 2016; Ong & Wang, 2015).  
The closest to our work is Ong and Wang (2015), which identifies women’s ALM for men 
of different income levels using visit shares of women of different income levels on the 
interaction of individual women visitor’s income and individual visited male profile’s income 
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 Such behavior is in-line with job search behavior in general which has been found to be reference-dependent on the prior job (Dellavigna, 
Lindner, Reizer, & Schmieder, 2017). In many cases, women literally also do search for jobs with less demanding more flexible hours, travel, 
and consequently lower pay after marriage and childbirth (Blau & Kahn, 2017). Men, in contrast, do not. This notion that a woman may search 
for a mate with a view to offsetting her opportunity cost is consistent with the long standing theory of habit formation and with the recent 
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& Rabin, 2012).  
Regardless of whether ALM has a standard microeconomic basis, we consider ALM as a primitive notion and focus on the potential over-
entry/congestion effect of a targeted search for a mate based on income. In particular, we test for the possibility of crowding out of high-
income women by the competitive entry of low-income women, when high-income men become more plentiful or richer. 
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their expected spouse’s salary, but not their own. This effect of women’s competitiveness on their expected spouse’s salary varies with the 
women’s gender identity, defined as the degree with which they agree with the statement that “a man should put career first and a woman 
should put family first” (Jeon & Ong, 2018). Hwang (2016) shows that other East Asian societies (not including China) tend to exhibit high 





in five cities. While we also capture the interaction between individual female visitor and 
individual profile income in a parallel fashion, our main treatment variable is the interaction of 
local sex ratio and men’s mean income with the women’s income dummies. We, moreover, 
allow for additional heterogeneity in the search behavior of the women by introducing 
interactions with the beauty ratings for our female visitors. These new interactions between 
aggregate variables and the beauty ratings allow us to capture the ‘competitive entry’ effect of 
beautiful low-income women into the marriage market for high-income men. It is this novel 
point of the competitive entry of low-income women into the market for high-income men that 
explains why high-income women’s probability of marriage, particularly the plain-looking 
among them, decreases despite the increases in their visits to high-income male profiles. 
III. Conceptual Framework 
A frictionless matching framework, even if women are constrained by ALM to only consider 
men whose income is higher than her own, would not explain our main finding that the scarce 
side of the market is hurt by its scarcity, i.e., are less likely to find a match and get lower surplus 
from matching when there are more potential matches. The inadequacy of a frictionless 
matching framework is obvious when one thinks of such matching in terms of an optimal 
assignment problem. No matter what the marriage surplus is, increasing the number of potential 
matches cannot decrease the number of actual matches. In other words, in a frictionless setting, 
when one side of the market becomes more numerous, the possible matches of the other side 
must increase. The only way the matches of high-income women could decrease at the same 
time as the number of their potential matches increases is if the apparently necessary connection 
between the relative number of agents on different sides of the matching market and the match 
rate is broken. 
We resort to the search literature for its greater level of flexibility, in particular, the directed 
search literature, which can explain our surprising finding that some part of the scarce side of 
the market is hurt by the increase in the availability or value of the other side. Directed search 
theory builds on the more traditional ‘random’ search theory, which itself introduces ‘frictions’ 
that allow for mismatches and non-matches in equilibrium to the matching theory framework 
of Becker. Agents in the random search framework choose to accept or reject potential matches 
arriving at random intervals based on a fixed exogenous distribution. These agents’ main 
tradeoff is between shorter waiting time with low-value matches and longer waiting time with 
high-value matches. In our empirical setting, such frictions capture the infrequent meeting 
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opportunities of women with high-income men in their daily life. Such frictions may be 
particularly severe for low-income women, because of sorting by educational and market 
institutions.  
However, notwithstanding the increased realism of frictions of random search, marital search 
tends to be targeted in the sense that individuals use observable characteristics such as height, 
beauty, and signals of income to decide on meetings. Such targeted search is captured in the 
directed search framework where agents use observations of posted prices and wages to choose 
the set of potential meetings, e.g., jobs to apply to. Such targeting by price anticipates the match 
surplus and obviates the need for bargaining over the surplus split presumed in the random 
search framework. Because such surplus can be anticipated, applications of directed search 
models of marriage-matching tend to assume a non-transferable utility framework 
(Arcidiacono et al., 2016).  
A key result in this literature, arising from the fact that agents choose the set of potential 
meeting partners simultaneously, is the possibility of equilibrium ‘coordination failure’ in the 
sense that multiple workers may show up for the same job, resulting in some workers remaining 
unemployed, while other vacancies remain unfilled because no workers showed up. This is 
because searchers’ probability of matching are interdependent. In contrast to random search, 
the crucial tradeoff for agents in a directed search framework is not between match surplus and 
waiting time, based on an exogenous distribution of potential matches, but between match 
surplus and the endogenous match probability, which depends upon all other agents making 
the same tradeoff simultaneously in equilibrium (Chade et al., 2017; Eeckhout & Kircher, 
2010; Wright et al., 2019). Within our context of changes in the local sex ratio or the mean 
income of high-income men, all women should re-adjust their tradeoff between high-
probability/low-value matches and high-value/low-probability matches when the local sex 
ratio or men’s income increases. Each woman’s search exerts a negative externality on other 
women’s probability of success in matching. Thus, to our knowledge, only a directed search 
framework can capture the crowding out phenomenon of plain-looking high-income women 
by beautiful low-income women that we observe. 
While the theoretical literature at present offers little guidance on the equilibrium 
comparative static effects of the population distribution (e.g., the local sex ratio of a city in our 
study) for a particular submarket (e.g., the marriage market for high-income men), we argue 
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that there are three factors which allow us to make a prediction about relative odds of marriage 
among different types of women within our setting.8   
First, the increase in sex ratio or the mean income of high-income men increases the 
availability or the value of the scarce high-income men. As a mathematical necessity, these 
increases must ultimately decrease the severity of the tradeoff between match value and match 
probability faced by some types of women in some submarkets in equilibrium. Thus, in the case 
of the greater availability of such men from an increase in sex ratio or higher value of such men 
from an increase in the men’s mean income, the expected value of searching for these men 
should increase for some if not all types of women in equilibrium.  
A second factor which could be used for predicting the women’s search intensity and relative 
odds of marriage is facial beauty. Becker (1973) predicts a tendency of beautiful women to 
match with high-income men. He posits that this is due to a complementarity between non-
market productivity and money income.9 The hypothesized complementarity between female 
beauty (proxied by youth) and men’s income is empirically supported in the economics 
literature (Weiss et al., 2019). (See Appendix 3 for a formulation of the complementarity and 
Footnote 3 in Appendix 3 for the connection between female beauty and fertility, and male 
income and female fertility.) This complementarity between men with high-income and 
beautiful women may be manifested in behavior such as sexual attraction rather than in realized 
fertility. Due to the potential complementarity between male income and female beauty, the 
search behavior of beautiful women may increase more strongly than plain-looking women in 
response to changes in the availability or mean income of high-income men (because such 
women have more to gain from matching--particularly with high-income men).10  
A third factor which could be used to predict the probability of marriage of different types 
of women is women’s ALM. Women’s ALM would predict that high-income women are less 
willing to make the tradeoff between match value and match probability than low-income 
women. In other words, while some low-income women may be willing to switch to searching 
for low-income men when the competition for high-income men increases, women’s ALM 
suggests that high-income women would rather choose either to pursue high-income men with 
greater intensity or resort to their better singlehood option.  
 
8
 We know of only one case where it has been worked out explicitly (Arcidiacono et al., 2016). Their theory does not apply to the case of  
heterogenous constraints on matching, as implied by our ALM assumption.  
9
 See Section 4 of Part I of the Appendix of Becker (1973). 
10
 This difference in search intensity that is increasing on the women’s beauty is analogous to more productive firms in the labor market 
that are theorized to respond more to increases in the probability of matching because they have more to lose from an unfilled vacancy (Chade 
et al., 2017). 
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Hence, to summarize, we expect that the search intensity of beautiful low-income women for 
these men will increase as the availability or value of high-income men increases, and the 
marriage probability of plain-looking high-income women will decrease. We first provide a 
simple model with two types of men and women based on a standard directed search framework 
in Appendix 3 to show how low-income women switching from surer matches with low-
income men to uncertain matches with high-income men, as the expected value of searching 
for such high-income men increases, may crowd out plain-looking high-income women from 
the marriage market. We then relax the discrete type assumption in a parametric simulation of 
the directed search and show that our predictions from the simple model still hold for a 
continuum of income and beauty types. 
IV. Online Dating Field Experiment 
Experimental Design 
We outline the design of our experiment in following paragraphs. To preview the structure 
of our analysis in the rest of the paper, we use the experiment to identify the comparative statics 
effects of women’s ALM on their search behavior as the sex ratio and men’s mean income 
vary. This analysis of the experimental data forms the basis of our predictions for marital 
patterns observed in the Census and household survey data in subsequent sections.  
Our field experiment extends Ong and Wang (2015) by testing for women’s ALM across 
many cities that vary in their local sex ratio. Our experiment is in the tradition of the 
considerable literature on correspondence studies of labor market discrimination. We used one 
of the largest online dating websites in China, with a reported membership of 100 million 
members in 2016. The website we used (along with its competitors) advertises itself as a 
marriage-matching website for white-collar professionals between the ages of 25 and 45 years 
of age.  
The users of this website can create a profile for free. The profile must include demographic 
(e.g., age and gender), socioeconomic (e.g., income), and physical characteristic (e.g., height) 
information, at least one photo, and a free-text personal statement. These requirements are 
standard to most online dating websites. Users may also add more information, and in particular, 
verifiable information to increase the “credibility” of their profile.11 Users can browse, search, 
 
11
 The credibility of the profile is indicated by a positive score, which can be increased with additional forms of verification, e.g., 
government-issued identification. All of our profiles simply display phone verification and one photo, giving them the minimal score. Such 
scores would not generally affect visit rates because they do not appear in search results. To affect visits, users must search specifically for 
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and interact with other members after registration. Generally, users start by entering their 
preferred age range and geographic location of partners into the search engine. The query 
returns a set of abbreviated profiles which include: an individual ID for the website, picture, 
nicknames, age, city, marital status, height, the first two lines of a free-text statement, and 
perhaps unique to China: income. Users can then click a link and ‘visit’ the full profile, where 
they can signal interest for free. Emails, however, require membership. The membership fee 
was 10 CNY/month at the time of the experiment when 1 USD was approximately 6 CNY. We 
recorded only visits.  
We constructed our 450 male profiles on this website by collecting nicknames, pictures, and 
statements from real profiles from another website that would have automatically hidden them 
after a month of inactivity.12 These profiles were posted for only 24 hours, after which, the 
accounts were closed. To further minimize any possibility of being recognized by 
acquaintances, we ensured that their picture was assigned to a province (city) that was different 
from their work area or birthplace.  
We assigned 30 profiles of five ages: 25, 28, 31, 34, and 37; three incomes: 3-5, 8-10, and 
10-20 (1k CNY) per month, which we will call low- (L-), middle- (M-), and high-(H-)income, 
respectively; and two replicas to each of the 15 major cities (see Appendix 4), resulting in 450 
profile ‘slots.’ Then, we randomly assigned 450 pictures, nicknames, and personal statements 
to these 450 slots. For the profile’s fixed traits, we gave all male profiles the height of 175cm. 
Birthdays were within eight days of each other and of the same zodiac sign. All of our profiles 
listed college education and the marital status of “single with no children” and “buy a house 
after marriage” (i.e., did not own a house). 
Users can see our profiles’ picture, nickname, age, city, marital status, height, income and 
the first few lines of a free-text statement in their default search results. They can then click a 
link and visit the full profile, which contained no additional information. For each of our 
profiles, we can see the profiles of the visitors by clicking their link in the history of visitors. 
 
low-credibility profiles. Even then, such searches would not affect visit rates across our profiles. The across-profile visit rates are the basis for 
our findings.  
12
 We are unaware of legal restrictions on the non-commercial use of user created content uploaded to social media websites in China. We 
assumed that such restrictions, if they exist, are weaker in China than in the United States, where our research activities would also fall under 
the “fair use” exemption to the US copyright law. Major US social media websites explicitly announce terms of use that effect ively make 
uploaded user created content public domain. For example, see, “publish content or information using the Public setting” in 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms. 
Visits to our profiles are likely to be brief, as they contain no information beyond what was already revealed in the search engine results. 
In fact, no one pursued further contact with any of our profiles. Our profiles are spread out among many other profiles on any given day. They 
are also spread out across many days. Users of this website are unlikely to encounter our profiles more than once (if at all). 
Chinese universities, similar to their European counterparts, do not have IRBs to approve the ethics of experiments. However, to the best 
of our understanding, our design falls under the “minimal risk” exemption from IRB approval. “Minimal risk means that the probability and 
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”  
See for example: http://humansubjects.stanford.edu/hrpp/Chapter9.html 
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The website records only visits to individual profiles once from any visitor even if they make 
multiple visits. Although visits across different profiles need not be from unique visitors, in our 
data, all visits were from unique visitors. This lack of repeated visits is expected because we 
took care to distribute our profiles between many other user profiles. Thus, to our knowledge, 
each of our data points is from a unique visitor. In any case, random assignment of 
characteristics to our profiles should rule out the individual idiosyncratic factors of our visitors 
as the primary driver of our findings.13 
We created profiles the day before to allow the website time to register them. Profiles of each 
age, income, and city combination were equally distributed in 12 days, with 35 to 40 profiles 
each day. We randomly logged in these 35 to 40 profiles with at least five minutes between 
any two, extending to at least 10 minutes between any two profiles in the same city. This 
procedure left at least one page between each of our profiles. For the 12 experimental days 
from August 23 to September 3, 2014, each account was open for only 24 hours. We alternated 
between logging in the next day’s profiles and collections of data on the previous day’s visit 
data. The total login/collection time was three to four hours per day depending on computer 
speed and the total number of visits our profiles received.  
In total, our male profiles received 1,811 visits from women. 1,474 of these visits have 
photos. Among these, 1316 were of a quality useable for rating, e.g., of high enough resolution, 
had faces not obscured by sunglasses...etc. We had a random sample of two-thirds or 867 of 
these women visitor’s photos rated for their beauty using a proprietary rating program 
accessible through a standard web browser. In the rating program, each female visitor’s photo 
(𝑖) is randomly matched with 10 other photos (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) from the pool of all photos. Each photo 
is selected with replacement from the pool of photos 20 times. Each photo was on average rated 
200 times, which is approximately 10 times the frequency of other studies. A total of 692 
Chinese raters (326 male) rated these 867 photos. The raters were graduate students from the 
Peking University HSBC Business School recruited through a mass email. We used two rounds 
for rating (one-third of photos in each round), because of our limited capacity to recruit raters 
during the first-round.14  
 
13
 The pictures, nicknames, and the first two lines of the personal statements were randomly assigned to profile slots. If the women’s 
choices were based on anything other than the income of the male profiles, we would find a uniform distribution of clicks across incomes and 
cities.  
14
 We paid raters 5 RMB to rate 100 pairs of photos in the first-round (January 4, 2016) and in the second-round (November 23, 2016). 
Given the few minutes it took to rate all 100 photos, our payment was relatively high for China. We set a high wage to attract sufficient 
numbers of raters in a short period. 
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We asked raters to choose the more physically attractive in each pair of 100 pairs instead of 
asking for a numerical rating within a specific range of numbers, as is standard in the field 
(Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994). This binary judgment may be easier and more precise than 
assigning a number to how good-looking someone is based on a numerical scale. The binary 
decision also avoids potential scale differences across individuals and genders which would 
add noise to our data. The software then aggregates the ratings for each photo into a continuous 
number between 0 percent, for the least attractive, and 100 percent, for the most attractive. For 
each photo, these numbers represent the share of other photos that the raters on average found 
less attractive.  
We also use data from another experiment which was run simultaneously with 390 female 
profiles in the same 15 cities. These female profiles had ages of 22, 25, 28, 31 and 34, a height 
of 163 cm, were college educated, and had incomes of 5k to 8k CNY/month. For our main 
experiment, we utilize the reported incomes of the male visitors attracted by these female 
profiles (restricted to the same ages (25-37) as our male profiles) to construct the distribution 
of men’s income on the website in the 15 cities.  
Description of the Data 
The summary statistics of age, income, and education for each gender of our visitors are in 
A-Table 6 and A-Table 7 of Appendix 4. The women visitors range in age from 18-45. In 2005, 
the median age of first-marriage for women was 23 according to the 2005 1 Percent Population 
Survey (often called “the mini-Census”). 98.5 percent were married by the age of 30. The 2010 
Census does not contain micro-level data of individual characteristics such as income or 
education. However, the CFPS data for 2010 show a similar pattern to the 2005 mini-Census. 
Accordingly, we find an abrupt decrease in the share of searches of women of all income levels, 
especially high-income women at age 30 in A-Figure 2.15 We focus throughout the paper on 
women in the age range of 20 and 30 years old. We use the visits from women age 31 and 45 
to check that the sex ratio we use does not affect the women outside of the age group that is the 
focus of our study.  
We calculate the local sex ratio (the log of the number of men/number of women) using 
county-level data based on the full sample of the 2010 Census.16 The local sex ratio for this 
 
15
 We find no such decline at any age for men. 
16
 See the tabulation of the 2010 Population Census at the county level by the National Bureau of Statistics. The 2010 Census released 
only the aggregate number of people of each gender in five-year age groups: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44. In our calculation of the 
local sex ratios, we assume each age within the five-year age group has same population size, e.g. the population size of age 22 is 1/5 of the 
population size of age group 20-24, which is reported by the Census. 
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experiment is defined as the number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over 
females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of experiment in 2014, proxied by 
males between the ages of 18 and 28 years old and females between the ages of 16 and 26 years 
old in the 2010 Census, which allows for the standard two-year age gap observed between 
married couples in China.  
The individual characteristics of our women visitors that we collected include income, age, 
years of education, and height. The website allows for the reporting of only nine income levels 
(<1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-5, 5-8, 8-10, 10-20, 20-50, and >50 in 1k CNY). We define h-, m-, and l-women 
by absolute cut-offs: l-women, that is, <3k/month, m-women: 3-5k, h-women: >5k. We set 
these levels to approximate the bottom-, middle-and top-thirds of women, which are the 
groupings we use throughout the paper. For women between the ages of 20 and 30 years old, 
the shares of l-, m-, and h-women are approximately 25, 39 and 26 percent of our visits, 
respectively. The low-income level is the omitted benchmark in all regressions.17  
In the following analysis, we show that the treatment effects of the sex ratio and men’s 
income in our online dating sample are consistent with the treatment effects in the 
representative samples in the Census and CFPS datasets. For the comparison to be valid, we 
need to rule out that the consistency in treatment effects is due to a fluke of comparing disparate 
populations that happen to have similar treatment effects. We cannot directly compare the 
women visitors’ characteristics to the women in the Census data because the 2010 Census does 
not contain individual-level income data.18 (The 2015 mini- census is not currently available.) 
We also cannot make the comparison using the CFPS data because that dataset covers 
provinces and has minuscule samples for the cities used in our experiment. Instead, we compare 
the characteristics of our female visitors to the single women in the Urban Household Survey 
(UHS). The UHS is conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics and covers a representative 
sample of the urban population at the city-level in China. The UHS 2012 sample is the closest 
year to 2014 (the year of our experiment) available. It covers four of the cities used in our 
experiment, namely, Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. These cities are located in 
the Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Western China, respectively.  
In comparison to single women in the UHS dataset, our female visitors are approximately 
four years older. 55 percent of single women in the UHS sample are younger than 26, whereas 
26 percent of our female visitors are within this age range, with half concentrated in the age 
 
17
 We used absolute cut-offs for incomes in the online dating section of the study because the website aggregates incomes into nine levels.  
18
 We also cannot make the comparison with the 2005 mini-census, which does contain individual income data, but is too distant in time 
to be comparable, especially given the fast pace of economic growth in China. 
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range of 26 and 32. We find, similar to Hitsch et al. (2010a) in the US, that the website users 
in China are more educated (one year, in our case). In comparison to the UHS sample, 14 
percent more of our women visitors have a college or higher level of educational attainment. 
(These distributional results are available on request.) Not surprisingly, given their older age 
and higher educational attainment, our women visitors also have a higher income than the 
general population.  
Hitsch et al. (2010a) find that differences in educational attainment and income become 
insignificant after controlling for internet use in the US. Controlling for internet use, which has 
been growing rapidly in China, would likely have the same effect. However, we cannot make 
the same adjustment because the UHS does not contain internet usage data. In the case of China, 
one additional potential reason why the website users’ educational attainment and income are 
higher is that educational attainment and income increased rapidly between 2012 and 2014 as 
a result of the Chinese Government’s expansion of educational opportunities (Knight, Deng, 
& Li, 2017) and China’s characteristic rapid economic growth. Instead of controlling for 
internet usage, we perform a Mincer-type regression of income on age and educational 
attainment for our women visitor sample and the single women in the UHS sample and plot the 
distribution of the residuals of each regression in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
These two distributions almost entirely overlap. The remaining differences in the distribution 
may be attributable to the limited sample size of 435 visits for our data for the four cities 
compared. We, moreover, directly compare the effect of age and educational attainment on 
income for the two samples in a dummy variable regression using the combined UHS and 
experimental samples in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
None of the coefficients for the interactions between the dummy for the experimental sample 
and the age and educational attainment variables are significant for single women in the UHS 
sample. The overlapping of the distributions in Figure 1 and the lack of significance of 
coefficients for the interactions in Table 1 suggest that our women visitors are not a specially 
selected sample of the general population, especially after controlling for age and educational 




Before we present our main findings, we first establish graphically in Figure 2 the correlation 
between the sex ratio and men’s income on the website and in the surrounding city for the cities 
used in the experiment.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The upper panel shows the distribution of men’s income on the website and in the surrounding 
city for the 15 cities used in the online dating experiment. The upper leftmost panel shows the 
distribution of reported incomes for our entire sample of 5,535 visits from men between the 
ages of 18 to 45 years old from the other experiment. The upper middle panel is restricted to 
the 3,520 visits from men between the ages of 25 to 37 years old, which is the age range that 
matches our male profiles. The upper right panel is restricted to the 2,832 visits from men 
between the ages of 22 to 32 years old, which is the age range of the men that we focus on 
throughout this paper. The lower left panel shows the income distribution of the men between 
the ages of 22 to 32 years old in the same 15 cities. The lower right panel shows that for the 
larger sample of 57 cities for which the 2005 mini-Census contained more than 300 respondents 
of either gender in the age range of 20 and 30 for women and 22 and 32 for men.19 These 57 
cities are the focus of our analysis of women’s marriage probabilities.  
Within each panel, the cities are divided into top-, middle-, and bottom-five city groups in 
terms of the magnitude of the local sex ratio. For the online dating data in the two upper panels, 
the sex ratios are defined as the number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over 
the number of females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of the experiments 
in 2014, based on the 2010 Census.20 The sex ratio in the lower two panels is similarly defined 
(with a minimum sex ratio of 0.79 and a maximum of 1.13) but use data from the 2005 mini-
Census.  
The upper panels show that our male visitors’ income distribution of cities with high sex 
ratio (top-five-city group) is noticeably more right-skewed than that of those in the medium-, 
and bottom-five-city group for every age group. For the 2005 mini-Census sample in the lower 
panels, we observe a slightly greater right skew for the distribution of men’s income for the 
middle-third sex ratio cities rather than the top-third. These panels suggest that male online 
daters in the 15 cities of our experiment and the men in the same cities for the 57 cities for 
 
19
 The 2005 mini-Census is the last available with income data. We find qualitatively identical results when we use 250, 300, and 350 
respondents.  
20
 Data from the 2015 mini-Census are unavailable. The Chinese Government has scarcely made any micro data available in the last five 
to 10 years. 
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which we have sufficient sample size are not poorer in higher sex ratio cities. The regression 
results for the 57 cities in A-Table 4 and A-Table 5 in Appendix 4 further suggest that the 
correlation between the local sex ratio and men’s income is not negative. These results imply 
that increases in the sex ratio are not driven by a disproportionate increase in the share of low-
income men compared with high-income men. Therefore,  
Observation 1. Men in higher sex ratio cities are richer on average than in low sex ratio 
cities. Higher sex ratio cities do not have a greater share of poor men either in the city itself or 
on the website associated with the city. 
The increase in women’s visits to high-income male profiles as sex ratios increase, which we 
hypothesize as possible, is already evident in the graphs of our data in Figure 3.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The graphs in Figure 3 exhibit visits by women to male profiles in each of the 15 cities of the 
experiment conditional on the local sex ratio, defined as the number of males between the ages 
of 22 and 32 years old over females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of 
experiment in 2014. These populations are proxied by males between the ages of 18 and 28 
years old and females between the ages of 16 and 26 years old in the 2010 Census, which 
allows for the two-year age gap observed between married couples in China. The horizontal 
axis indicates the sex ratio of the city. The vertical axis displays the percentage of visits (%), 
which is the total number of visits received by each type (age and income) of male profiles in 
each city divided by the visits to all our profiles over all male income types in the same city. 
The key finding is that the gap in the graphs of women’s visits to middle- to high-income men 
and from low- to high-income men clearly increases on local sex ratios. This pattern suggests 
that the marginal impact of increases in men’s income on the visits of women increases with 
the local sex ratio.  
Recall that we fixed the number of profiles (10 for each of our three income levels) across 
all cities in our online dating experiment. Thus, our high-income profiles should have received 
a constant share (relative to our medium- and low-income profiles) of all visits in the higher 
sex ratio cities given a constant distribution of visits to the three income levels across all cities, 
not a larger share, as our main findings indicate. In other words, 
Observation 2. Our high-income profiles can only receive a larger share of all of the 
visits to our profiles in higher sex ratio cities if women visit high-income men more than low-
income men when men are richer or plentiful. 
To see which group of women contributed most to the increased visits, we grouped female 
visitors into three income levels: <3, 3-5, and >5 (in 1k CNY) in Figure 4.  
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[Insert Figure 4 here] 
These levels are labelled as l-, m-, and h-women, respectively and are represented by three lines. 
These three income levels for women are lower than the three incomes levels for our male 
profiles, because as in most countries, women in China typically earn less than men. The left 
(low sex ratio cities) and the right (high sex ratio cities) panels of Figure 4 show that women 
of all income levels visit high-income male profiles with greater probability. However, our 
focus here is not on the mate attraction effect of the absolute level of men’s income on women’s 
behavior, but rather on the effect of men’s income relative to women’s incomes on women’s 
behavior in three respects.  
First, each panel shows that the slopes of the lines connecting the mass points of these 
probability mass functions rotate counter-clockwise. This rotation indicates that the probability 
of women’s visits to high-income male profiles increases with their reported incomes. Second, 
we show a kink in the graph of the high-income women at point B and B’, which suggests that 
their visit rates to high-income male profiles (10-20k) increases significantly compared with 
that of middle-income male profiles (8-10k), that is, as the profile’s income exceeds the 
women’s average income (which is approximately 15k). Third, previewing the main findings 
in Table 2, Figure 4 displays a further counter-clockwise rotation from the left to the right 
panels (AB – BC and A’B’ – B’C’) from the cities with low sex ratio to those with high sex 
ratio for high-income women. For example, although a small percentage of h-women’s visits 
were to male profiles with reported earnings of 3-5k/month in the bottom-eight sex ratio cities 
(point A), visits to such male profiles remain visibly lower to the point of being nearly zero in 
the top-seven cities (A’). Approximately 75 percent of h-women visits were to the 10-20k male 
profiles in bottom-eight sex ratio cities (C), but approximately 85 percent of their visits was to 
that type of profile in the top-seven cities (C’). These three levels of evidence suggest the 
increased search effort of high-income women, due to women’s ALM, even before we impose 
controls econometrically. 
Regression Analysis 
Here, we discuss the formal analysis of search behavior as revealed by our online dating data, 
which constitute the basis for our predictions for married couples observed in the Census and 
household survey data. We exclude 51 visits without income information from the 1,811 visits 
we received from women, leaving 1,760 visits for analysis. Each of our 450 male profiles is at 
one of the three income levels in one of the 15 cities of the experiment. Let the income level of 
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the male profiles that woman 𝑖 chooses to visit be represented by the latent variable 𝑦𝑖∗. We 
observed her visits if these were made to one of our three income types of male profiles. We 
treat each as one of the three choices in an ordered probit model 𝑦𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖      Eq.(1) 
where X includes m-women dummy (medium-income women), h-women dummy (high-income 
women), and log sex ratio (the log of the number of men/number of women—sex ratio from 
this point forward) and its interactions with the above two dummies, and individual and city 
characteristics.21 
We control for the wage distribution (means and standard deviations of men’s and women’s 
incomes) from the incomes of our visitors, and therefore, women’s average opportunity costs 
for presumably specializing in household production after marriage when testing for the change 
across cities in their search intensities. We use the ordered probit regression to model the 
probability that a woman from a specific income level visits a male profile of a specific income 
level among all income levels of male profiles. We interpret this probability as the search 
intensity for a man of a specific income level. This search intensity, being a probability, is 
normalized by the total number of visits per women’s income level at the city-level.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 displays the results of the ordered probit regression of women’s visits as a function 
of their income and the local sex ratio for women in the prime age marriage market of 20-30 
years of age. The positive term for the h-women dummy (0.502) in column (1) of Table 2 
indicates that high-income women visit high-income male profiles more than low-income 
women do, thereby confirming our impression from Figure 4 and supporting previous findings 
(Ong & Wang, 2015). Column (1) of Table 2 demonstrates not only that the intercept for high-
income women is higher than that of the benchmark low-income women, but also that the 
difference increases with the sex ratio (1.765). In apparent contradiction to our competitive 
entry hypothesis, the coefficient for sex ratio for the benchmark low-income women is small 
and statistically insignificant (0.432) in column (1) of Table 2. 22  However, the lack of 
significance can also be attributed to low-income women, who enjoy more outside-options 
among low- and medium-income men, behaving heterogeneously according to their beauty. In 
 
21
 Note that our treatment variable in the experiment is men’s income type (H, M, and L). However, this may not be evident in our ordered 
logit regression because men's income type does not appear on the RHS. Nevertheless, this information is implicit in our dependent variable, 
that is, the log odds of visiting higher income men.  
22
 This insignificance can be due to our design being naturally biased towards a negative effect for increases in sex ratio. Our fixed number 
of high-income profiles at fixed income levels should receive fewer visits in cities with higher sex ratio, where men on the website (and in the 
surrounding city) are richer and more plentiful. Hence, the reader should perhaps interpret the weakly negative coefficients as weakly positive. 
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particular, we show that the lack of significance is due to the less attractive among low-income 
women decreasing their search intensity for high-income men. This decrease exerts an 
offsetting effect on the increased search intensity of the beautiful low-income women for these 
same men.  
We control for the beauty percentile ranking of female visitors in column (2) of Table 2 
which we acquired for a random sample of two-thirds of these visits. Importantly for our 
previous finding of an insignificant increase in the search intensity of low-income women for 
higher income men, column (2) of Table 2 also reveals heterogeneity in the reactions of women 
according to their beauty rank and income level to increases in the sex ratio. The significantly 
negative coefficient for sex ratio (-6.219) indicates a pronounced decrease in the search 
intensity among of the benchmark plain-looking low-income women for high-income men 
when the sex ratio increases. By contrast, the highly significant positive coefficient for sex 
ratio*beauty (12.131) indicates a pronounced increase in the search intensity among the 
beautiful low-income women for high-income men when the sex ratio increases. Thus, 
increases in the sex ratio induce divergent reactions among beautiful and plain-looking low-
income women, which helps to explain the apparent lack of reaction of low-income women in 
aggregate (when we do not disaggregate by beauty) in column (1) of Table 2.  
The medium- and high-income women show diminishing contrasting reactions by their 
beauty rank as the sex ratio increases, due to their ALM. The significant positive coefficient 
(5.401) for the interaction between the sex ratio and the medium-income women dummy 
suggests that the plain-looking among them react less negatively than low-income women to 
the increase in the sex ratio. In contrast, the weakly negative coefficient (-8.339) for the 
interaction among sex ratio, beauty rank, and the medium-income women dummy suggests that 
the reaction of the beautiful among medium-income women to the sex ratio is less influenced 
by their beauty than those among low-income women. The positive and significant coefficient 
(10.879) for the interaction of the sex ratio and the high-income women dummy suggests that 
the plain-looking among the high-income women search more intensively for high-income men 
when these men are more plentiful. Similarly, in contrast, the negative coefficient (-19.219) for 
the high-income women suggests that their reaction to the sex ratio is less positively influenced 
by their beauty compared with that for low-income women.  
This pattern of decreasing differentiation in search intensity for high-income men by 
women’s beauty rank, as the women’s income level increases, is expected because the lower 
the women’s income level, the larger their set of options among low-income men, and 
therefore, the greater their latitude to avoid the increasing competition for high-income men. 
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Moreover, as indicated in column (3) of Table 2, these contrasting behaviors between beautiful 
and plain-looking women with different income levels become more significant for women 
between the ages of 20 and 30 years old and insignificant or reversed (-20.534) for women 31-
45 in column (5), which suggests that these results are driven by women in the prime marriage 
market age in China. We largely confirm these contrasting behaviors for women between the 
ages of 20 and 30 years old with the Bartik (1991) style instrumental variable for the sex ratio 
in column (4) of Table 2,23 though the levels of significance of some coefficients are reduced. 
See A-Table 8 for the first-stage results. 
We calculate the marginal effects of the sex ratio on high-income women’s probability of 
visits based on the coefficients of the ordered probit regression in column (3) of Table 2, for 
women 20-30 years of age, keeping all variables at their mean values. A 10 percent increase in 
the sex ratio decreases the probability of plain-looking low-income women’s (ranked in the 
25th percentile in beauty rank) visits to high-income male profiles by 24.2 percentage points.24 
In contrast, the same increase in the sex ratio increases the plain-looking high-income women’s 
visits to high-income male profiles by 8.9 percentage points, which is approximately half the 
increase of the 16.7 percentage points of beautiful low-income women (75th percentile in 
beauty rank) to high-income men’s profiles.  
To summarize, the reaction to the increase in the sex ratio of the plain-looking among 
medium- and high-income women is less negative than that of the plain-looking among low-
income women. The reaction of the beautiful among the medium- and high-income women is 
less positive than that of the beautiful low-income women. Thus, the greatest contrast between 
the behaviors of the high- and low-income women when the sex ratio increases is between the 
plain-looking high-income women and the plain-looking low-income women. The women’s 
own beauty rank makes less of an impact on their search intensity for high-income men as the 
 
23
 We construct the Bartik-type IV sex ratio by using the well-established gender segmentation by industry (e.g., more women are 
employed in service industry, whereas more men in construction and manufacturing). If an industry is male- (female-) dominated, and a city 
has a large share of population working in this industry, then the overall sex ratio in this city tends to be biased towards men (women). By 
focusing on the historical industry composition of the city, we can isolate the sex ratio that is driven only by the labor demand, which is 
presumably not correlated with the preference in the marriage market. By using the industry-specific sex ratio at the national level excluding 
this city, we remove the mating preference possibly contained in the local sex ratio. The Bartik sex ratio of city c in year 2010is:  ?̅?𝑐,2010 =∑𝛾𝑐𝑗,2000𝑅−𝑐𝑗,2010𝑗  𝛾𝑐𝑗,2000 is the historical share of employment in industry j of city c from earlier census in 2000. 𝑅−𝑐𝑗,2010 is the sex ratio of all workers 
employed in industry j nationwide excluding city c, in year 2010. 
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 In our ordered probit model, the probability of each type of male profile being visited is given by 𝑃(𝐿 = 1) = Φ(𝜅1 − 𝑋𝛽) , 𝑃(𝑀 = 1) = Φ(𝜅2 − 𝑋𝛽) − Φ(𝜅1 − 𝑋𝛽) , and 𝑃(𝐻 = 1) = 1 − Φ(𝜅2 − 𝑋𝛽) , where 𝜅1  and 𝜅2  are the estimated cutoffs, and Φ  is the 
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. We calculate the marginal effect on each probability’s change as 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑋, keeping 
all explanatory variables at their mean values. For a positive coefficient 𝛽𝑖 of 𝑋𝑖, the marginal effect 𝜕𝑃(𝐿=1)𝜕𝑋𝑖 = −𝛽𝑖ϕ(𝜅1 − 𝑋𝛽) < 0, where ϕ 
is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution, and 𝜕𝑃(𝐻=1)𝜕𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖ϕ(𝜅2 − 𝑋𝛽) > 0, wheres 𝜕𝑃(𝑀=1)𝜕𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖ϕ(𝜅1 − 𝑋𝛽) −𝛽𝑖ϕ(𝜅2 − 𝑋𝛽) is in general ambiguous. 
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women’s income increases because their reluctance to substitute toward low-income men 
increases with the women’s own income. This result is expected if high-income women are 
more determined (less willing to avail themselves of the option of low-income men) to match 
with a high-income man, when the competition for high-income men increases, due to women’s 
ALM. These results are summarized by Observation 3. 
Observation 3. Among low-income women, the more beautiful they are, the more they 
visit high-income men when the sex ratio increases. By contrast, plain-looking low-income 
women visit high-income men less when the sex ratio increases. Both effects decrease with 
women’s income level. 
We next examine the effect of the changes in the mean income of high-income men on the 
behavior of the women who visited our male profiles. We use the top-third of men by income 
who visited our female profiles in another experiment for our measure of high-income men.25  
These female profiles were in the same cities as this experiment on the visits of women to our 
male profiles. High-income men’s mean income as compared to middle- and low-income men 
would determine the expected value of targeting the top-third of men within in a directed search 
framework. In equilibrium, women’s beliefs about the mean income of such men are correct. 
Also, within a directed search framework, women’s expected value of targeting such men takes 
into account the likely level of competition they face. We test for the effect of these men’s 
mean income on the visit rates of our female visitors to our high-income male profiles in 
columns (1)-(3) of Table 3. We use the same abbreviations (H-, M-, and L-income) for these 
male visitors, as we do for the male profiles we created to attract female visitors, because these 
male visitors are of approximately the same income levels as our male profiles. L-men are the 
benchmark male visitors in our regression. We hold constant the income of the middle- and 
bottom-third income male visitors (M- and L-men, respectively). We omit discussion of the M-
men because, being intermediate between H-men and L-men, the effect of the change in their 
mean income on high- and low-income women is ambiguous. We also omit the results for mean 
income of the benchmark L-men because they are almost always insignificant for l- and m-
women. Moreover, less than 4 percent of h-women visit such men. We make these results 
available on request.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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 Recall that we gathered this income information from the men visiting our female profiles in another experiment that we conducted 
simultaneously with this experiment. For a given city, we divided the male visitors into top-, middle-, and bottom-thirds in terms of the income 




To begin, we control for the effect of the sex ratio in Table 3. As in column (3) of Table 2, 
the sex ratio remains negative but is now insignificant in column (1) of Table 3. Similar to 
increases in the sex ratio in column (3) of Table 2, the influence of beauty rank on women’s 
response to the increase in the mean income of high-income men diminishes as women’s 
income level rises in column (1) of Table 3, because of women’s ALM. As with increases in 
the sex ratio in column (3) of Table 2, increases in the income of high-income men induce 
opposing reactions among the beautiful and the plain-looking low-income women in column 
(1) of Table 3.  
When the income of high-income men increases, the significant negative coefficient of mean 
income of H-men (-0.483) indicates that plain-looking low-income women are less likely to 
pursue (more likely to exit the market for) high-income men. The insignificant coefficient 
for mean income of H-men*beauty (0.567) suggests that beautiful low-income women are 
weakly more likely to enter the market for high-income men when their mean income increases, 
and strongly (0.868) more likely to enter when we instrument the sex ratio in column (2) of 
Table 3. The significant positive coefficient for mean income of H-men*m-women dummy 
(0.615) in column (1) of Table 3 indicates that the plain-looking medium-income women are 
less likely than low-income women to exit (at least weakly more likely to enter) the market for 
high-income men.  
In contrast, the significant negative coefficient for mean income of H-men*beauty*m-women 
dummy (-0.853) indicates that beautiful medium-income women are significantly less likely to 
enter than beautiful low-income women when the income of high-income men increases. The 
significant positive coefficient for mean income of H-men*h-women dummy (0.990) indicates 
that plain-looking high-income women are less likely to exit (at least weakly more likely to 
enter) the market for high-income men than low-income women. Similarly, in contrast, the 
significant negative coefficient for mean income of H-men*beauty*h-women dummy (-1.370) 
indicates that beautiful high-income women are less likely to enter than beautiful low-income 
women. These patterns are even more significant when we instrument the sex ratio in column 
(2) of Table 3, but they are completely absent for women age 31-45 in column (3). Again, as 
with the sex ratio results for women age 20-30 in column (3) of Table 2, this pattern of 
decreasing differentiation by beauty rank among women as women’s income increases is 
expected if high-income women are more determined to match with a high-income man (and 
less willing to avail themselves of the option of low-income men), due to women’s ALM. 
Calculating the marginal effects based on column (1) of Table 3, a 10 percent increase in the 
mean income of high-income men decreases the probability of the plain-looking low-income 
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women’s visits to high-income male profiles by 13.3 percentage points. By contrast, that same 
increase in mean income increases the plain-looking high-income women’s visits to high-
income male profiles by 12 percentage points. Thus far, we find for plain-looking women a 
parallel change in behavior when either the sex ratio or high-income men’s mean income 
increases. However, the parallel holds only weakly for beautiful low-income women. Beautiful 
low-income women’s search intensity for high-income men increases insignificantly with the 
increase in men’s mean income. We explain this apparent anomaly next. 
The increase in the visit rate of plain-looking high-income women to our high-income male 
profiles when the mean income of other profiles rises is remarkable given that our high-income 
male profiles are then relatively less attractive. One would expect that the change in these 
women’s rate of visits would be negative. Given this expectation of a negative coefficient, one 
should perhaps interpret the aforementioned lack of significance in the beautiful low-income 
women’s visit rates to high-income male profiles as likely significantly positive. This weaker 
increase in the search intensity of beautiful low-income women for our high-income male 
profiles is also consistent with the possibility of these high-income men exerting greater effort 
in their search for a beautiful girlfriend/wife when their income increases, and thereby, 
obviating the need of these women to increase their own search intensity for high-income men. 
To preview, Table 4 presents evidence that is consistent with this possibility; men’s search 
intensity for beautiful women increases with the men’s income. 
These results in column (1) of Table 3 are summarized in Observation 4. 
Observation 4. Even controlling for the effects of the sex ratio, among low-income 
women, the more beautiful they are, the more they visit high-income men when the latter’s 
mean income increases. By contrast, plainer looking low-income women visit high-income 
men less when the latter’s mean income increases. Both effects decrease with women’s income 
level. 
Thus far, our results indicate that low-income women’s entry into the market for high-income 
men when the sex ratio or high-income men’s income increases increases with their (the 
women’s) beauty rank. These results predict that the probability of high-income women 
(particularly the plain-looking) marrying decreases when either the sex ratio or high-income 
men’s income increases. We test these predictions after testing for demand-side effects of 
men’s search behavior. We divide men into rich and poor and show the interaction between 
these men’s probability of visits to more beautiful women and the sex ratio in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 use the level of men’s income (0.822 and 0.935, respectively) 
in 1k CNY/month. Columns (3) and (4) use a high-income men dummy, which represents men 
with incomes higher than 10k CNY/month. The search intensity of high-income men for 
beautiful women does not increase with the sex ratio in either case. High-income men are not 
more likely to search for a beautiful girlfriend/wife when they have more potential competition 
from other men. Column (2) displays this by interacting the sex ratio and the level of men’s 
income. Column (4) shows this by interacting the sex ratio and the high-income men dummy. 
Column (4) does, however, show that low-income men are weakly less likely to visit beautiful 
women where the sex ratio is higher (-8.969). 
Observation 5. Men’s probability of visits to more beautiful female profiles increases 
with the men’s income, but not with the sex ratio. 
Hence, although richer men search more vigorously for beautiful women, that greater search 
intensity does not increase with the availability of men. This result suggests high-income men 
are not more desperate in the face of what should be greater competition. 
V. Results from Census and Household Survey Data 
Marriage Probability 
Here we test for the effects that we have found thus far of the accumulating entry of beautiful 
low-income women into the mating market for high-income men on the marriage probability 
of high-income women. These results predict that the marriage probability of high-income 
women, particularly the plain-looking among them, decreases with this competitive entry, 
whereas that of low-income women, including the plain-looking, is not adversely affected. We 
use the 20 percent random sample of the 2005 China mini-Census.26 The entire sample contains 
2,585,481 individuals in 31 provinces in China.27 Again, we restrict the sample to women 
between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. Males earn a positive income, and both males and 
females have urban hukou.28  We also excluded cities for which this mini-Census sample 
population of men and women in the prime age for the marriage market is below 300. 
Excluding the smaller cities makes our sample of cities here more similar to our sample of large 
cities in the online dating part of our study. Our findings are only slightly less significant if we 
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 2005 is the latest year available which contains individual income data. 
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 Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan were excluded. 
28
 An internal passport system from the command economy era: a hukou entitles holders to local benefits and to government social services. 
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exclude cities with more than 250 or 350 of the men and women of interest. These results are 
available on request. Excluding cities in provinces with significant minority populations, which 
can exhibit unique marriage-matching traditions, we obtain a final sample of 20,929 women.29  
We estimate the following logit model of the probability of being married for woman i 𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖|𝑋) = exp⁡(𝑋𝛽)1+exp⁡(𝑋𝛽)     Eq.(2) 
where the dependent variable is the marital status of female i in city c. It equals 1 if the woman 
is married and 0 if she is single. The local sex ratio is again the log of the number of males 22 
and 32 years old over the number of females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old in each 
city. The mean incomes of H-, M-, and L-men are defined as the top-, middle- and bottom-
thirds, respectively, of the income distribution of the male populations of each city. With regard 
to these income levels, the average bounds across cities for men are 1,211-5,978 CNY/month 
for H-men, 757-1,123 CNY/month for M-men, and 194-702 CNY/month for L-men. The 
average bounds across cities for women are 1,019-3,197 CNY/month for h-women, 610-934 
CNY/month for m-women, and 191-547 CNY/month for l-women. These ranges are not 
necessarily contiguous because the average bounds across cities are not the averages of bounds 
defined within each city.30  
We interact the dummy variables for the different categories of women with the sex ratio and 
the mean income of H-, M-, and L-men. We use the mean income of men with different income 
categories within a city as the treatment variable because these are exogenous to women’s 
individual income. Again, we omit discussion of the M-men because the effect of the change 
in their mean income on high- and low-income women will be ambiguous in our theoretical 
framework. We also omit L-men because less than 6 percent of h-women marry them. The 
regression results are presented in Table 5. Columns (1)-(3) present results for the same cities 
as in Table 2 for the online dating experiment. Columns (4)-(6) extend the sample to 57 cities 
for which we have a sample of more than 300 survey responses from each of men and women.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The weakly positive coefficient for the sex ratio in columns (1)-(6) of Table 5 for the 
benchmark l-women is consistent with our hypothesis that they may merely substitute towards 
high-income men when more of them are available. Controlling for educational attainment and 
the interaction of the mean income of men with different income levels with women’s income 
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 The provinces we dropped are Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. 
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 Note also that although women earn a lower income, the average bounds of incomes of the men and the women overlap for each income 
category. In particular, the average lower bound of the income of low-income men (194-702 CNY/month) is not higher than the average upper 
bound of the income of high-income women (1,019-3,197 CNY/month). 
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type in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6), high-income women are at least weakly more likely to be 
married than low-income women. Consistent with our findings of the competitive entry of 
beautiful low-income women into the market for high-income men when the sex ratio increases 
in column (3) in Table 2, the availability of men negatively affects the marriage probability of 
high-income women (sex ratio*h-women dummy) in all specifications in Table 5. In the case 
of column (1), where we restrict the sample to the 15 cities of the experiment and do not 
introduce interactions between the mean incomes of men with different income types, the larger 
standard error (2.362) makes the effect of the sex ratio insignificant. However, significance 
returns in column (2) when we introduce the interactions and in column (4) when we increase 
the sample to those 57 cities with more than 300 responses from each of men and women. We 
use the coefficient for sex ratio (-1.938) in column (5), where we also control for the interaction 
of the mean income of men with different income types of women, to calculate the marginal 
effect of the sex ratio evaluated at the mean values of all variables. A 10 percent increase in the 
sex ratio decreases the probability of high-income women marrying by 4.8 percentage points 
compared with low-income women, and by 1.2 percentage points in absolute terms, although 
the latter estimate suffers from a standard error that is too large to be significant.31  
Moreover, consistent with our finding in column (3) in Table 2 of differentiation in search 
intensity by beauty rank among low-income women when the income of high-income men 
income increases, columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) in Table 5 show that the marriage probability 
of low-income women increases significantly with increases in the mean income of high-
income men. This increase in high-income men’s income should increase low-income 
women’s probability of marriage because it strictly improves the low-income women’s options 
among high-income men. Consistent with this competitive entry hypothesis, the marriage 
probability of high-income women decreases relative to low-income women and even 
absolutely with respect to a zero benchmark with increases in H-men’s mean income.  
Women’s marriage probability can decrease with their level of educational attainment in the 
West (Isen & Stevenson, 2010) and in China. This is consistent with the possibility that women 
who have lower marriage market endowments (e.g., attractiveness to men) have better labor 
market endowments or work harder (Boulier & Rosenzweig, 1984). However, this pattern is 
also consistent with our hypothesis that women’s probability of marriage decreases with their 
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 Our results with married couples based on the income levels of women can be biased by their decision to participate in the labor market. 
We include only employed wives in our Census data. However, we do not know if these wives had reduced or planned to reduce their labor 
market participation prior to marriage. Nevertheless, we find similar qualitative results when we impute the wages for women using their age, 
educational attainment, and the number and gender of their children based on the methodology in Zhang and Liu (2003). (These results are 
available upon request.) 
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opportunity costs, which may have a purely educational component. High-income women’s 
probability of marriage may also decrease because the number of highly educated women rises 
faster than the number of highly educated men, rather than as a result of the increase in 
competition from low-income women. To control for this possibility, columns (3) and (6) 
additionally control for the effect of the relative supply of men with a college or above 
education to women with a college or above education (Edu ratio). The coefficient for Edu 
ratio and Edu ratio*h-women dummy is not significant for column (3) but is significant for 
column (6), which suggests that high-income women may benefit from more educated men. 
The interaction between sex ratio and the high-income women dummy and the interaction 
between the mean income of high-income men and the high-income women dummy are only 
slightly changed.  
We also find that women’s probability of marriage decreases with the increase in dispersion 
in men’s income, which is consistent with women waiting longer when the income inequality 
among men increases (Gould & Paserman, 2003). However, our other coefficients are 
unchanged in terms of significance when we control for the dispersion in men’s income. (These 
results are available on request.)  
We use the most conservative coefficient (-1.904) of the interaction between the mean 
income of H-men and h-women dummy in column (6) to calculate the marginal effect of the 
sex ratio evaluated at the mean values of all variables. A 10 percent increase in the mean income 
of high-income men decreases the probability of marriage for high-income women by 5.4 
percentage points compared with low-income women. Women’s ALM predicts this relative 
negative effect. When the competition for high-income men escalates, high-income women, 
unlike low-income women, are less disposed to substitute towards low-income men to avoid 
this competition.  
However, this negative relative effect of H-men’s income on h-women’s probability of 
marriage (relative to low-income women) is also consistent with a positive total effect of H-
men’s income on h-women’s probability of marriage. In that case, the marriage probability of 
women of all income levels increases, but that of high-income women increases less than that 
of low-income women. Such a positive total effect is also consistent with a possible men’s 
aversion for higher income mates. In the case of men’s aversion to higher income mate, we 
expect that the first-order effect of an increase in the mean income of high-income men is to 
increase high-income women’s marriage probability, because more of these women are of 
lower income than the high-income men. This is what we find in the 15 cities of the experiment. 
However, in the larger sample of 57 cities, we find a weakly negative total effect of men’s 
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mean income on high-income women’s marriage probability, which is the sum of the 
interaction and the level of the mean income of H-men (-1.904+1.740=-0.164). Hence, our 
evidence does not support the men’s aversion to higher income women hypothesis as the driver 
of our findings.32  
The finding that the probability of marriage of high-income women does not increase with 
increases in men’s incomes is remarkable because it does not support an important intuition 
and an empirical observation of positive assortative matching. When men are richer, more high-
income women can match positively with them. However, this intuition/observation for women 
on average disregards the effect of increased competition from women’s ALM for mate 
income. Further corroboration of women’s ALM comes from the fact that the marriage 
probability of high-income women is also insignificantly affected by the incomes of low-
income men (available on request). We find none of these results when we restrict the women 
to those above the age of 31 (available on request).  
We summarize our findings with the Census data as follows. 
Observation 6. The marriage probability of high-income women decreases significantly 
with the local sex ratio and the incomes of high-income men relative to low-income women, 
whereas that of low-income women increases weakly on the local sex ratio and significantly 
on the income of high-income men.  
Somewhat supportive of standard theory, the average effect of the sex ratio on marriage 
probability at the bottom of Table 5 is positive for the larger sample of 57 cities with sufficient 
sample size, whereas it has a negative effect for the 15 cities of the online dating experiment. 
However, in both cases, the standard errors are too large for statistical significance. Hence, on 
average, women benefit somewhat from higher sex ratio. Our results suggest, however, that the 
weak effect of the sex ratio on the average woman belies its strong redistributive effects across 
women with different income levels.  
We can gain further insight into which high-income women are losing ground to the 
competitive entry of beautiful low-income women with the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 
2010 baseline dataset, which has beauty ratings of surveyed subjects. 33  The CFPS is a 
comprehensive survey of individual-, family-, and community-level data across China, 
 
32
 Our finding that high-income women’s probability of marriage decreases weakly with high-income men’s income is consistent with 
decreasing marginal utility of income relative to the marginal utility of beauty as these men’s income increases. We  provide evidence for this 
in Observation 5. In that case, high-income men will prefer beautiful low-income women as their income increases. However, whereas men’s 
relative decreasing marginal utility of mate income compared with mate beauty may explain why plain-looking low-income women decrease 
their search intensity for high-income men when these men’s income increases, but it does not explain why plain-looking high-income women 
do not decrease their search intensity for the same men. 
33




covering various aspects of economic and non-economic issues. It includes 16,000 households 
in 25 provinces and is representative of the whole population of China. We restrict the sample 
to married couples living in urban areas with a local hukou. We dropped the couples wherein 
the husband does not earn a positive income. Again, we constructed the sex ratio, which equals 
to the number of males between the ages 22 and 32 years of age over females between the ages 
of 20 and 30 years of age using data from the 2010 Census.34 We restrict women to those 
between the ages of 20 and 30 years old, thereby leaving us a sample of size of 965. We use 
surveyor’s 0 to 7 scale rating of the beauty of those they surveyed.35 
We define the beautiful dummy = 1 for the top-20 percent of all women (rated 7 on the 1-7 
scale). We again estimate the logit model of the probability of being married for woman i in 
Equation (2). Again, we define the mean income of h-, m-, and l-women to be the top-, middle- 
and bottom-third, respectively, of the income distribution of the female populations of each 
city. Table 6 shows the logit regression for the marriage probability for women with different 
income and beauty levels interacted with the local sex ratio and men’s mean income in a city. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 shows that sex ratio has no effect on the marriage probability of either the plain-
looking low-income women benchmark (0.945) or the beautiful-looking low-income women 
(-1.238). Table 6 also shows, however, that sex ratio does exert a significantly negative effect 
on plain-looking high-income women (-7.294), but a weakly positive effect on beautiful high-
income women (9.817). In terms of marginal effects, the marriage probability of plain-looking 
high-income women is 10 percentage points lower than the plain-looking low-income women 
and actually declines 8.7 percentage points in absolute terms when the local sex ratio increases 
by 10 percent. This result suggests that the decline in the high-income women’s probability of 
marriage as the sex ratio increases observed in the interaction of the sex ratio and the h-women 
dummy in all columns of Table 5 may be limited to the plain-looking among high-income 
women. Unfortunately, the small sample sizes we have for many provinces (e.g., less than half 
of the 29 have more than 30 data points for men’s income) do not permit us to study the 
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 We find quantitatively and qualitatively similar results when we restrict the sex ratio to include men and women between the ages of 20 
and 29 years old, and test for the probability of women between the ages of 20 and 30 years old married to men to between the ages of 20 and 
30 years old. We also find similar results when we use this same sex ratio and test for the probability of women between the ages of 20 and 
30 years old married to men between the ages of 20 and 32 years old. The same is true when we restrict the sex ratio to include men and 
women between the ages of 20 and 34 years old and test for the probability of women between the ages of 20 and 30 years old married to men 
between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. 
35
 We find that the means and standard deviations of women’s facial beauty do not vary systematically with the sex ratio of the provinces 
used in our analysis for any of the high-, medium-, and low-income levels of women. The details are available upon request. There were 269 
surveyors for our sample of 965 surveyed women between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. Surveyor fixed effects are infeasible for us to 
introduce because raters rated on average only four subjects, which is far below the number necessary for demeaning. In many cases, there 
was a unique surveyor for a surveyed subject.  
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potential linear relationship between women’s marriage probability and the interaction of the 
mean income of men with different income types with CFPS data, as we did in Table 5 with 
the Census data.36  
Observation 7. The marriage probability of the plain-looking high-income women 
decreases relative to plain-looking low-income women and even in absolute terms when the 
sex ratio increases. 
We checked whether the beauty of the wife of high-income men also increases with the sex 
ratio. As might be expected from the increased entry of beautiful low-income women into the 
market for high-income men, we find that the wife of the high-income man is more attractive 
than that of the low-income man. Importantly, consistent with the predictable consequences of 
our result that a greater share of beautiful women competes for high-income men when these 
men become more plentiful, the beauty of the wife of high-income men increases with the sex 
ratio. Observation 3 suggests that the increase in the beauty of the wife of high-income men 
with the sex ratio is not due to the demand-side (high-income men’s increased search effort for 
a beautiful wife). These findings (available on request) provide further evidence of our 
competitive entry hypothesis derived from our analysis of online dating data. 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
We use variations in men’s incomes and the local sex ratio to explore the increasing burdens 
on high-income women from the competitive entry of low-income women into the market for 
high-income men due to women’s ALM. When the local sex ratio or the income of high-income 
men increases, such that there are more high-income men or high-income men are richer, there 
is an increase in the search intensity of beautiful low-income women and that of the high-
income women—even the plain-looking among them—for high-income men (Observation 3 
and Observation 4). In contrast, only plain-looking low-income women decrease their search 
intensity for high-income men when the local sex ratio or the income of high-income men 
increases (Observation 3 and Observation 4).  
The consequence of this competitive entry of beautiful low-income women into the mating 
market for high-income men is evident in the marriage probability of low-and high-income 
women. Despite the greater search intensity of high-income women relative to low-income 
 
36
 We have 1114 men and 965 women in 25 provinces in the sample, with an average of 40 subjects of each gender in each province, with 
an actual range from 7 to 213 men and 5 to 185 for women. Since we have three types of men (by income) and six types of women (by income 
and beauty), there is not enough variation within some provinces with few observations. For instance, there are 9 provinces without any 




women, their marriage probability decreases relative to low-income women’s when there are 
more high-income men or when high-income men are richer (Observation 6). The marriage 
probability of low-income women increases weakly on the sex ratio and significantly on high-
income men’s mean income.  
Analysis of the CPFS data reveals that it is specifically the plain-looking among high-income 
women whose marriage probability decreases relative to low-income women and even in 
absolute terms when the sex ratio increases (Observation 7). Moreover, the beauty of the wife 
of high-income men increases with the sex ratio. The fact that we did not find that high-income 
men’s search for beautiful women increases with the sex ratio (Observation 5) is consistent 
with the interpretation that the decrease in high-income women’s marriageability when the sex 
ratio increases is the consequence of low-income women searching more intensively for high-
income men when the sex ratio increases. Thus, taken as a whole, we provide substantial 
evidence for the intra-gender competition between women for high-income men that we 
hypothesized based on the prior evidence of ALM.  
Due to the limitation of the sample size of the CFPS data for the prime age marriage market, 
we cannot show with direct observations whether the decrease in the marriage probability of 
high-income women relative to low-income women when high-income men’s income 
increases is mostly driven by plain-looking high-income women. Moreover, given the 
limitation of our experimental design of fixing high-income men’s income across cities, we 
can show only that the change in the search intensity of the beautiful low-income women 
increases weakly when the income of other high-income male profiles increases. We would 
expect, however, that the competitive entry of beautiful low-income women to be stronger 
when high-income men’s income increases than when the sex ratio increases. This stronger 
competitive entry from the increase in high-income men’s income combined with these men’s 
increased search intensity for beautiful women (Observation 5) would predict that plain-
looking high-income women would be even more disadvantaged in the marriage market when 
high-income men’s income increases than when the sex ratio increases. Therefore, we would 
expect plain-looking low-income women to decrease their search intensity for high-income 
men, because they can advantageously substitute towards the now freed-up low-income men. 
By contrast, high-income women, who would not avail themselves of the low-income men 
option when the competition for high-income men increases because of women’s ALM, can 
only increase their search intensity for high-income men. Thus, circumstantial evidence 
suggests that it is the plain-looking among high-income women rather than the beautiful who 
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experience the relative decrease in their probability of marriage we find with Census data when 
high-income men’s income increases.  
We emphasize that these high-income women are “leftover” in our framework not because 
they are undesired by men, as most men in China are in a desperate struggle to achieve the 
financial prerequisites for eligibility required by the ever-shrinking share of marriage-age 
women. Rather, high-income women remain single because their desire for the small share of 
men who are high-income (who could, therefore, compensate the women’s substantial labor 
market opportunity costs from motherhood and specialization in household production) is 
unreciprocated by these men. This lack of reciprocity is to be expected given that these high-
income men can compensate a large share of women, and therefore, can afford to be choosey 
based on beauty. Thus, whereas men in China must be leftover by a mathematical necessity, 
high-income women are only leftover by their rational choice, given their high opportunity 
costs of adopting traditional gender roles.  
It is precisely the high-income women’s better singlehood option which allows us to 
rationalize women’s ALM and predict that the plain-looking among them are more likely to be 
single when the men they seek exclusively become more attractive to beautiful low-income 
women. Within the directed search framework, searchers tradeoff between match value and 
match probability in equilibrium. When there are more high-income men or when their mean 
income is higher, the severity of the tradeoff should be relaxed for at least some types of 
women. Given a complementarity between female beauty and male income, we would expect 
that beautiful women low-income women, who might have limited their search to low-income 
men, are most likely to benefit in redirecting their search to high-income men. Such substitution 
behavior by low-income women would crowd out the plain-looking high-income women from 
marrying the high-income men to their singlehood outside option.   
Our finding that high-income women’s marriage probability declines with sex ratio and the 
mean income of high-income men may be explained by an attendant higher reservation value 
for men’s income on the part of high-income women, which leads to delay. Their reservation 
value may increase because of an increase in the dispersion in men’s income, as was shown in 
the important work of Gould and Paserman (2003). However, we control for such dispersion 
in all our regressions. Thus, the decrease in marriage probability for high-income women, in 
particular, the plain-looking we find is on top of the delay due to dispersion in men’s income.  
Nevertheless, a greater number of men may increase the reservation value of the women and 
cause delay, even without increasing the dispersion of men’s income, because the greater 
number of men increases the women’s probability of matching. For this hypothesis to be true, 
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the greater number of men would have to make only the plain-looking high-income women 
choosier since we find that only they suffer a decrease in marriage probability. However, we 
would expect that the greater number of men would also make the beautiful high-income 
women choosier. But, their marriage rate is not significantly affected by the local sex ratio. 
Furthermore, our results are not consistent with the alternative hypothesis that they are driven 
by men’s aversion to higher income mate instead of women’s aversion to a lower income mate. 
If that were the case, high-income women's probability of marriage should increase as high-
income men become richer, because these richer men would find a greater number of high-
income women earning less than them. 
According to our hypothesis, women’s ALM is driven by their labor market opportunity cost 
of motherhood. In that case, ALM should weaken with decreases in foregone earnings in terms 
of lifetime income due to delayed childbirth (Leung, Groes, & Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2016). 
Moreover, high-income women who are willing to delay may have lower fertility intent, and 
therefore, lower ALM as female fertility declines steadily after age 30, becoming more rapid 
after age 35.37  Indeed, Brandt et al. (2018) find with Census data (which do not contain 
information on beauty) that while highly educated women’s marriage rate catches up after age 
of 35, the realized fertility of women who marry after age 30, which has consistently been 
lower than women who marry earlier, has been declining steadily. The delay in marriage and 
decline in fertility is expected if these highly educated women faced increasing competition for 
high-income men as sex ratio and men’s income relative to women’s has increased, as they 
have in China.  
Our findings based on online dating field experimental, household survey, and Census data 
demonstrate the novel, and to our knowledge, unexplored comparative statics effects of 
women’s ALM for mate income. We suggest that these comparative static effects are the 
consequence of women’s attempt to cover their labor market opportunity cost of household 
specialization after marriage and childbirth (which increases with their income) with the shared 
income of the man whom they marry.   
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VIII. Tables and Figures 
 
FIGURE 1: RESIDUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN’S VISITOR AND SINGLE UHS WOMEN’S INCOME  
Notes: The Urban Household Survey (UHS) from 2012 is the closest year to the year of our experiment, conducted in 2014. The cities of the 
UHS overlaps with the four cities used for the experiment, namely, Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. The residual distribution was 





FIGURE 2: MEN’S INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS ON ONLINE DATING WEBSITE AND CENSUS DATA 
Notes: The upper panels display the distribution of men’s income on the website. The lower panel displays that for the surrounding city for 
the 15 cities used in the online dating experiment and the 57 cities used in our analysis of the 2005 China mini-Census data with more than 
300 respondents of either gender. Within each panel, the cities are divided into top-five (top5 cities), middle- five (mid5 cities) and bottom- 
five (bot5 cities) five-city groups in terms of the magnitude of the local sex ratio. For the upper panels, these sex ratios are defined as the 
number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over the number of females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of 






FIGURE 3: SHARE OF WOMEN’S VISITS BY MALE PROFILE INCOME LEVEL AND SEX RATIO 
Notes: The women visitors to our male profiles between the age of 25-37 years old are between the ages of 18 and 45 years old. The horizontal 
axis indicates the sex ratio of the city. The vertical axis displays the share of visits, which is the total number of visits received by 
each income type of male profiles in each city divided by the visits to all our profiles for all male income types in the same city. The three 
lines represent the three income types of our male profiles. The graph shows an increasing gap between the visit rates of women for men who 
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FIGURE 4: SHARE OF WOMEN’S VISITS TO MALE PROFILES BY WOMEN VISITOR’S INCOME AND SEX RATIO 
Notes: We group women’s visits into three income levels: <3, 3-5, and >5 (in 1k CNY), and label them as l-, m-, and h-women, 
respectively. The three lines represent the three groups of visitors. We calculate the percentage of visits of each type of women to 
each type of male profile. For example, on the left side, the percentage of visits of h-income women to high-income (10-20k) men 
is approximately 70 percent, in contrast to their visits in top-seven sex ratio cities, where it is 80 percent. All three points in each 
line add up to 100%. The lines for the top-seven sex ratio cities are rotated versions for those of the bottom-eight, indicating that 




TABLE 1: REGRESSION COMPARING WOMEN’S VISITOR CHARACTERISTICS AND UHS SAMPLE 
 Base group: UHS sample Log income 
 Age 18-45 Age 20-30 Age 20-30 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age  0.259** 0.964 0.061** 
 (0.071) (0.445) (0.015) 
Age2 -0.004** -0.018  
 (0.001) (0.009)  
Edu years 0.095** 0.065 0.090 
 (0.028) (0.048) (0.043) 
Experiment sample 1.178 7.266 1.034 
 (1.939) (7.679) (0.899) 
Age*Experiment sample -0.055 -0.543 -0.013 
 (0.154) (0.622) (0.031) 
Age2*Experiment sample 0.001 0.011  
 (0.002) (0.012)  
Edu years*Experiment sample 0.026 0.012 -0.014 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.044) 
City FE Y Y Y 
Constant 1.967 -6.281 4.685*** 
 (0.865) (5.146) (0.302) 
Observations 12,758 10,545 10,545 
R-squared 0.551 0.598 0.510 
Notes: The Urban Household Survey (UHS) from 2012 is the closest year to the year of our experiment, conducted in 2014. The 
cities of the UHS overlap with four of the cities used in our experiment, namely, Dalian, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. The 
sample size for the experiment is 435 observations, whereas that for the UHS data is 12,323 observations. FE means fixed effects. 




TABLE 2: ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION OF WOMEN’S VISITS ON MALE PROFILE INCOME 
Dependent variable:  Income level of male profile visited (low (3-5k), middle (8-10k), high (10-20k)) 
 Age 18-45 Age 18-45 Age 20-30 Age 20-30 (2SLS) Age 31-45 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
m-women dummy 0.156 -0.636 -0.993* -0.889 -0.210 
 (0.113) (0.508) (0.543) (0.567) (0.788) 
h-women dummy 0.502*** -0.736* -1.727*** -1.943*** 0.117 
 (0.159) (0.393) (0.620) (0.714) (0.754) 
Sex ratio 0.432 -6.219** -11.381*** -6.512 5.093 
 (0.638) (2.491) (3.485) (5.336) (3.577) 
Sex ratio*m-women dummy 0.891 5.401* 10.285** 8.854 -3.895 
 (0.859) (3.222) (5.157) (5.469) (6.485) 
Sex ratio*h-women dummy 1.765** 10.879*** 15.861*** 15.826*** 5.657 
 (0.892) (2.678) (4.770) (5.773) (5.285) 
Beauty  -1.184 -1.973** -1.142 2.006** 
  (0.800) (0.821) (0.980) (0.905) 
Beauty*m-women dummy  1.172 1.713* 1.466 -0.133 
  (0.967) (1.008) (1.042) (1.634) 
Beauty*h-women dummy  1.957*** 3.722*** 3.960*** -1.321 
  (0.736) (1.124) (1.284) (1.931) 
Sex ratio*beauty  12.131*** 20.817*** 13.027 -20.534*** 
  (4.277) (5.097) (8.138) (6.764) 
Sex ratio*beauty*m-women 
dummy  -8.339 -16.738* -13.786 14.794 
  (7.248) (9.311) (9.705) (16.266) 
Sex ratio*beauty*h-women 
dummy  -19.219*** -29.824*** -28.938*** 7.079 
  (4.912) (7.906) (9.855) (12.547) 
Additional controls:       
Age and education dummies of 
female visitors Y Y Y Y Y 
Mean and standard deviation of 
men’s and women’s incomes in 
each city 
 Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,760 867 548 548 308 
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.066 0.085 0.085 0.088 
Notes: Data from the online dating experiment, wherein each observation is a visit (click) from a woman visitor. The local sex ratio is defined 
as the number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of experiment 
in 2014, proxied by males between the ages of 18 and 28 years old and females between the ages of 16 and 26 years old in the 2010 Census. 
h-, m-, and l-men indicate top-, middle- and bottom-third women by monthly income in each city, respectively. The l-women are the omitted 
benchmark with income less than 3k CNY/month. m-women dummy = 1 if the woman’s income is 3-5k CNY/month. h-women dummy = 1 
if the woman’s income is more than 5k CNY/month. Beauty is the beauty percentile rank of female visitors which we acquired for a random 
sample of 2/3 of visits. Column (4) is the second stage of the Bartik-type IV regression results for column (3). The first stage is in A-Table 8 
of Appendix 5. The mean and standard deviation of men’s and women’s incomes are based on the online dating users and defined in 1k CNY 




TABLE 3: ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION OF WOMEN’S VISITS ON MALE PROFILE INCOME  
Dependent variable: Income level of male profile visited (low (3-5k), middle (8-10k), high (10-20k)) 
 Age 20-30 Age 20-30 (2SLS) Age 31-45 
 (1) (2) (3) 
m-women dummy -1.619 -1.027 -1.464 
 (1.172) (1.265) (1.426) 
h-women dummy 0.006 -0.308 -0.487 
 (1.595) (1.428) (1.232) 
Sex ratio -4.289 3.793 -3.215 
 (3.532) (6.261) (3.149) 
Sex ratio*m-women dummy 0.804 0.241 4.315*** 
 (1.721) (1.597) (1.620) 
Sex ratio*h-women dummy -1.962 -2.599 7.053** 
 (1.953) (1.665) (2.954) 
Beauty -3.494* -3.099 0.853 
 (1.929) (2.036) (1.292) 
Beauty*m-women dummy 4.001* 2.888 4.565* 
 (2.263) (2.359) (2.603) 
Beauty*h-women dummy 2.105 2.389 -0.497 
 (2.913) (2.653) (2.237) 
Sex ratio*beauty 9.518* -3.466 -2.816 
 (5.680) (10.222) (6.693) 
Mean income H-men -0.483** -0.649*** 0.348 
 (0.201) (0.208) (0.237) 
Mean income H-men*beauty 0.567 0.868** -0.284 
 (0.402) (0.403) (0.495) 
Mean income H-men*m-women dummy 0.615*** 0.674*** -0.137 
 (0.187) (0.207) (0.265) 
Mean income H-men*beauty*m-women dummy -0.853** -1.001*** -0.426 
 (0.368) (0.375) (0.563) 
Mean income H-men*h-women dummy 0.990*** 0.927*** -0.276 
 (0.288) (0.279) (0.260) 
Mean income H-men*beauty*h-women dummy -1.370** -1.322*** 0.084 
 (0.538) (0.499) (0.657) 
Additional controls:     
Age and education dummies of female visitors Y Y Y 
Mean and standard deviation of men’s and women’s 
incomes in each city Y Y Y 
Observations 548 548 308 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.098 0.117 
Notes: Data from the online dating experiment, wherein each observation is a visit (click) from a woman visitor. The local sex ratio is defined 
as the number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old at the time of experiment 
in 2014, proxied by males between the ages of 18 and 28 years old and females between the ages of 16 and 26 years old in the 2010 Census. 
h-, m-, and l-men indicate top-, middle- and bottom-third women by monthly income in each city, respectively. The l-women are the omitted 
benchmark with income less than 3k CNY/month. m-women dummy = 1 if the woman’s income is 3-5k CNY/month. h-women dummy = 1 
if the woman’s income is more than 5k CNY/month. H-, M-, and L-men denote top-, middle- and bottom-third of male visitors to our female 
profiles by monthly income in each city, respectively. The results for M-and L-men are suppressed and available on request. Beauty is the 
beauty percentile rank of female visitors which we acquired for a random sample of 2/3 of visits. Column (2) is the second stage of the Bartik-
type IV regression results for column (1). The first stage is in A-Table 8 of Appendix 5. The mean and standard deviation of men’s and 
women’s incomes are based on the online dating users and defined in 1k CNY at the city-level. Robust standard errors clustered at the city-







TABLE 4: OLS REGRESSION OF MEN’S VISITS ON FEMALE PROFILE’S BEAUTY 
Dependent variable Beauty ranking (0-100) of female profile visited 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income of men 0.822*** 0.935**   
 (0.267) (0.343)   
Sex ratio  -3.131  -8.969 
 
 (21.026)  (5.638) 
Income of men*sex ratio  -0.909   
 
 (2.568)   
H-men dummy   1.341** 1.739** 
   (0.584) (0.790) 
Sex ratio*H-men dummy    -3.416 
    (5.762) 
Additional controls:     
Age and education dummies of male visitors Y Y Y Y 
Mean and standard deviation of men’s and 
women’s incomes in each city Y Y Y Y 
Constant 43.543* 31.034 50.095** 37.538 
 (22.873) (24.894) (21.643) (23.678) 
Observations 5,288 5,288 5,288 5,288 
R2 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.044 
Notes: Data from another experiment which was run simultaneously with 390 female profiles in the same 15 cities. The income of 
men is measured in 1k CNY/month. These profiles of females had ages of 22, 25, 28, 31, and 34, with a height of 163 cm, were 
college educated, and had incomes of 5-8k CNY/month. The local sex ratio is calculated in the same way as in Table 2. L-men is 
the omitted benchmark in column (3) and (4) with income less than 5k CNY/month. M-men = 1 if the men’s income is between 5k 
and 10k CNY/month. The results for M-men are suppressed and available on request. H-men = 1 if men’s income is more than 10k 





TABLE 5: LOGIT REGRESSION OF WOMEN’S MARRIAGE PROBABILITY (CENSUS DATA) 
Dependent variable Logit: 1 = married, 0 = single 
 15 cities in experiment 57 cities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sex ratio 0.120 2.270 2.450 1.520 1.425 1.652* 
 (2.472) (2.045) (1.686) (0.964) (0.967) (0.988) 
h-women dummy -0.210 0.127 0.389 -0.110 1.109 0.927 
 (0.180) (2.396) (2.558) (0.099) (1.348) (1.358) 
Sex ratio*h-women dummy -2.308 -4.579** -4.452** -1.760** -1.938** -2.098** 
 (2.362) (1.813) (1.834) (0.856) (0.935) (0.924) 
Edu ratio (men BA+/women BA+)   -0.793   -0.282 
   (0.563)   (0.183) 
Edu ratio*h-women dummy   0.165   0.273* 
   (0.489)   (0.157) 
Mean income of H-men  6.179*** 5.810***  1.891** 1.740* 
 
 (1.580) (1.584)  (0.937) (0.892) 
Mean income of H-men*h-women 
dummy  -4.849*** -4.759***  -2.159*** -1.904*** 
 
 (1.445) (1.497)  (0.713) (0.715) 
Additional controls:       
Age and education dummies of 
women 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Mean and standard deviation of 
men’s and women’s incomes in each 
city 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.329 -2.480 -0.506 1.089 0.710 0.927 
 (2.388) (3.442) (1.388) (1.184) (1.855) (1.893) 
Observations 10,888 10,888 20,929 20,929 20,929 20,929 
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.292 0.298 0.298 0.299 0.299 
 Average effect of sex ratio 
 0.120 2.270 2.450 1.520 1.425 1.652 
 +(-1.778)/3 +(-3.945)/3 +(-4.064)/3 +(-0.504)/3 +(-0.354)/3 +(-0.344)/3 
 +(-2.308)/3 +(-4.579)/3 +(-4.452)/3 +(-1.760)/3 +(-1.938)/3 +(-2.098)/3 
 = -1.242 = -0.571 = -0.389 = 0.765 = 0.661 = 0.838 
Notes: Data are from the 2005 China mini-Census, restricted to men and women with an urban hukou, and positive monthly income. Women 
are restricted to those between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. The local sex ratio is defined as the number of men between the ages of 22 and 
32 years old over the number of women between the ages of 20 and 30 years old in the 2005 mini-Census in each city. H- (h-), M- (m-), and 
L-(l-) men (women) are defined as top-, middle- and bottom-1/3 men (women) by monthly income in each city, respectively. The l-income 
women are the omitted benchmark. Results for M-men and m-women are suppressed and available on request. Edu ratio is defined as the 
number of males with a bachelor’s degree or higher over the number of females with a bachelor’s degree or higher in the city. Sex ratio, edu 
ratio, and all incomes are in log form. To calculate the average effect of sex ratio, denote the coefficients for sex ratio, sex ratio*m-women 
dummy, sex ratio*h-women dummy by a, b, and c. The marginal effect of sex ratio on l-women is a, on m-women is (a+b), and on h-women 
is (a+c). Given that women are divided into three groups equally, the average effect is a/3 + (a+b)/3 + (a+c)/3 = a + b/3 + c/3. Robust 




TABLE 6: LOGIT REGRESSION OF WOMEN’S PROBABILITY OF MARRIAGE BY BEAUTY (CFPS DATA) 
Dependent variable  
 Logit: 1 = married, 0 = single 





Sex ratio*h-women dummy 
-7.294** 
 (3.183) 
Beautiful dummy 0.823** 
 (0.370) 
Beautiful dummy*h-women dummy 
-0.607 
 (0.423) 
Sex ratio*beautiful dummy 
-1.238 
 (3.756) 
Sex ratio*h-women dummy*beautiful dummy  9.817 
 (6.535) 
Mean income of men 0.023 
 (0.383) 
Additional controls:  
Age and education dummies of women Y 
Mean and standard deviation of men’s and  





Pseudo R2 0.344 
Notes: Data are from China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2010. The CFPS provides the residency status of individuals and 
households only at the provincial level. The sample is restricted to men between the ages of 22-32 years old and women between 
the ages of 20 and 30 years old with an urban hukou, and positive monthly income. The local sex ratio defined as the number of 
males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over the number of females between the ages of 20 and 30 years old in each province 
is calculated using the 2010 Census. The sex ratio and all incomes are in log form. h-, m-, and l-women are defined as top-, middle- 
and bottom-1/3 women by monthly income in each province, respectively. The l-women are the omitted benchmark. The results 
for m-women are suppressed and available on request. Beautiful dummy = 1 if a woman has a beauty rating of 7 out of 1-7 scale 





Appendix 1. Visit rates of men and women to online dating profiles with randomly assigned 
income (Reproduced from Ong and Wang (2015)) 
A-Figure 1 shows the share of clicks or “visits” by women of different income levels 
to male profiles with randomly assigned incomes. All three graphs show an increasing 
trend, which suggests that women not only visit high-income men with greater frequency, 
but specifically those who are higher income than themselves. The shallowest slope is for 
the women who report earning less than 5,000 CNY per month. The steepest slope is for 
the women who report earning 10,000-20,000 CNY per month. The kink in each graph 
marks the statistically significant incremental increase in women’s visit rates when the 
profile’s income exceeds the average income of the women visitors. This kink further 
suggests women’s ALM, along with the increase in the slope. 
 
A-FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF FEMALE VISIT PER INCOME LEVEL VS. INCOME OF MALE PROFILES. 
Notes: The number in brackets is the count of visits for women at the adjacent income level.  
 
In contrast to the pattern in A-Figure 2, men of all income levels visit female profiles 
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A-FIGURE 2: PERCENT OF MALE VISITS PER INCOME LEVEL VS. INCOME OF FEMALE PROFILES. 
Notes: The number in brackets is the count of visits for men at the adjacent income level. 
 
Appendix 2. Marriage shares (Reproduced from Ong, Yang, and Zhang (2015)) 
We find further support for the ALM hypothesis suggested by the online dating data in 
Appendix 1 with the 2005 1 Percent Population Survey (often called “the mini-Census”) 
data of married couples. We restrict the sample to people between 22 and 55 years old 
with urban hukou and then identify and match 39,988 first-marriage couples in nuclear 
families where both spouses have positive incomes. A-Figure 3 depicts the distribution 
of married couples by the wife’s relative income (wife’s income divided by the sum of 
the husband’s and wife’s incomes), following the approach of Bertrand et al. (2015), 
using U.S. data. We extend their results by ranking the wife’s income within each city 
and age, and divide them into the top- and the bottom-half groups, represented by the 
solid and dashed lines in A-Figure 3, respectively, to separate possibly different effects 
across high- and low-income women.  
In each graph, we confirm with Chinese data the extreme “skewness” in the distribution 
of marriages, as measured by a sharp drop-off in the frequency of marriages just as the 
wife’s income exceeds that of her husband’s. The McCrary (2008) test of the 
discontinuity of the distribution function indicates that both distributions drop at the 0.5 
point of household income (p < 0.01). Our findings are similar to those of Bertrand et al. 
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for the wife earning more than the husband. However, they did not categorize the wives 
into high- and low-income groups and compare these drops.  
 
A-FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF SPOUSES BY WIFE’S SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME WITH CITY LEVEL DATA 
Notes: Data are from China 2005 1 Percent Population Survey. We identified and matched 39,988 first-marriage couples in nuclear 
families, both between 22 and 55 years old with urban hukou and positive incomes. Wife’s share of household (monthly) income = 
wife income / household income, grouped into 20 bins. We estimated the discontinuity to the right of the point of 0.5. Solid and dash 
lines represent top-and bottom-half of wives by income within each age in each city. 
The gap between the dashed line (bottom-half of wives by income) and the solid line 
(top-half of wives by income) in A-Figure 3, when we disaggregate by income, is 
revealing. We briefly discuss here how the increasing drop supports our women’s ALM 
hypothesis. See Ong, Yang, and Zhang (2015) for further details.  
Starting from the left-hand side of the 0.5 share of household income point, the solid 
line is noticeably below the dashed line and then crosses to rise above it. This crossing 
indicates that, before the 0.5 share point, a smaller fraction of high-income wives (solid 
line) contribute a small share to household income and a larger fraction of high-income 
wives contribute more equally with their husbands to their household income. The 
probability drop at 50 percent of the household income point is 0.253 for the bottom-half 
of women, increasing to 0.326 for the top-half women. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
confirms that the difference in the overall distributions of the two groups is significant (p 
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The larger drop in the marriage rate as the women’s income exceed that of her husband 
for high-income women is consistent with high-income women being even more willing 
to settle for men with only slightly higher or equal income than themselves than low-
income women. We expect such a pattern, given our ALM hypothesis, because high-
income women face competition for high-income men from low-income women, while 
low-income women do not face similar competition from high-income women for low-
income men. This higher level of competition constrains high-income women to a lower 
average match surplus from their mate’s income (based on their reservation value as 
singles) than low-income women. Under our ALM hypothesis, this reservation value is 
correlated with the women’s own income. This lower surplus is reflected in a larger mass 
concentrated on the immediate left of the 0.5 share point of household income, and 
therefore, a larger drop off to the right of 0.5 for the high-income women group as 
compared to the low-income women group. These trends are confirmed in A-Figure 4, 
where we divide the women into income percentiles. 
 
A-FIGURE 4: SIZE OF DROP IN DISTRIBUTION OF SPOUSES BY WIFE’S INCOME RANK WITH CITY LEVEL DATA 
Notes: The percentile rank of wife’s (monthly) income is calculated for each city and age. For all wives within a percentile rank, we 
plot their relative income distribution, like A-Figure 3, and estimate the distribution drop at the 0.5 point. Then we plot the distribution 
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Appendix 3. A Game Theoretic Illustration of the Competition between High- and Low-
income Women1  
The model in A-Table 1 illustrates how beautiful-looking low-income women adjusting 
their tradeoff between a sure match with a low-income man and an uncertain match with 
a high-income man can crowd out plain-looking high-income women, who (because of 
their ALM) seek these high-income men exclusively, from the marriage market. We 
model only this across-income competition between beautiful low-income women and 
plain-looking high-income women, and not the within-income competition, because our 
main goal here is to show that high-income women can be negatively affected by the 
increase in the sex ratio or income of high-income men due to the attendant increase in 
the entry of beautiful low-income women. We focus on the latter women also because we 
showed empirically that plain-looking low-income women decrease their search intensity 
for high-income men, and also that beautiful high-income women’s probability of 
marriage did not decrease with the increase in sex ratio. Including these two types of 
women in our model would not add insight into the crowding out of the plain-looking 
high-income women (hereafter, high-income women) by the beautiful low-income 
women (hereafter, low-income women) and may obscure the insights on the crowding 
out effect. 
We adapt the directed search model of homogenous buyers and sellers in Burdett et al. 
(2001) to the case of heterogenous types in the marriage market. (See Section III 
Conceptual Framework for a discussion of our motivation for using the directed search 
framework.) Burdett et al. focus on equilibrium prices, which determine the surplus share 
between homogenous buyers and sellers. In our marriage-matching context, we can think 
of the women as buyers and the men as sellers. Instead of paying a price, women pay a 
search cost which varies with their income type. Making the buyer’s cost exogenous and 
not equivalent to the seller’s benefit does not substantially change the analysis from 
Burdett et al., because in our setting, the men (i.e., the sellers) are passive players. 
However, the men’s preference for beauty affects the probability of a woman matching 
with them. Burdett et al. also assume symmetric numbers of buyers and sellers. We 
discuss how changes in the sex ratio would affect our results in our simple setting. See 
 
1
 We are grateful to Barton Lipman for developing this example with us. All errors are ours. 
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also the 2 x 2 model on p. 27 in Wright et al.'s (2019) review. Eeckhout and Kircher’s 
(2010) generalize much of the directed search literature, including Burdett et al. (2001), 
to continuous actions and any distribution of a continuum of heterogeneous types (Chade 
et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2019). 2   
To specify the payoffs in this game, recall that Becker (1973) posits a complementarity 
between the wife’s beauty and the husband’s income which is supported empirically 
(Weiss et al., 2019).3 Thus, one possible formulation of the matching incentives is as 
follows. The choice of a woman of income type 𝑤 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ}  who earns 𝑦𝑤 , where 𝑙 
represents low-income, and ℎ represents high-income, and has beauty percentile rank 0 < 𝑏𝑤 < 1 to be single or to marry a man of income type 𝑚 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻} who earns 𝑥𝑚, where 𝐿 represents low-income, and 𝐻 represents high-income, is  𝑢𝑤 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑦𝑤 , 𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + 𝛿(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤)𝑦𝑤)} .  Eq. (1) 
The first component in the max function is the value of being single, which is just the 
woman’s own income. The second component in the max function is the value of a 
possible marriage for the woman. The product 𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤  reflects the complementarity 
discussed above and may include the public good of children in the family. 𝛿, 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1, 
is the woman’s share of the household income as wife, which we assume, for simplicity, 
is exogenously given by the social norms, i.e., is independent of the woman’s income or 
beauty. Women discount their own after-marriage wages by⁡𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤), 0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤) ≤ 1. 
The discount factor, 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤) , declines in 𝑏𝑤  and the man’s or the woman’s gender 
identity 𝑛.4 Thus, a woman may marry a man who earns 𝑥𝑚 if the value of marriage is 
higher than being single:    
 
2
 Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) model racial discrimination within a directed search framework can be extended to model 
our marriage market by incorporating four instead of two types of searchers. However, in contrast to our marital context, their model 
would still not include heterogenous search costs from marriage market frictions, heterogenous outside options from different 
opportunity costs of marriage (which drives our ALM), and complementarity between the searcher’s and their target’s characteristics 
(i.e., female beauty and male income). 
3
 See Section 4 of Part I of the Appendix of Becker (1973). This complementarity between men’s income and women’s beauty 
may be due to the complementarity between male resource investment and female fertility for viable offsprings. In terms of the 
attractiveness of high resource males to females, beyond the economics literature cited in the introduction indicating that women 
prefer higher income men (Hitsch et al., 2010a; Ong & Wang, 2015), there is an extensive evolutionary psychology literature on how 
conspicuous consumption on the part of men may increase their attractiveness to women by signaling the men’s income and potential 
investment of resources in their offspring. In terms of the attractiveness of indicators of female fertility to males, facial femininity, 
which adds to female facial beauty and attractiveness to men, signals high levels of the female hormone oestrogen, and therefore, 
fertility (Jokela, 2009; Rhodes, 2006). There is evidence that men’s fertility increases on their income (Hopcroft, 2006).  
It is obvious that men find beautiful women sexually attractive. As to evidence that women find high-income men sexually 
attractive, the female orgasm is hypothesized to be a potential discriminator of male quality in terms of the likelihood of conception 
or selective bonding with higher quality sires (Pollet & Nettle, 2009). Female orgasm frequency is an important component of female 
sexual satisfaction and it increases on the husband’s income based on the analysis of a large representative sample from the China 
Health and Family Life Survey (Parish et al., 2007; Pollet & Nettle, 2009).  
4
 This decline reflects past findings suggesting that men and women tend to discount women’s after-marriage income (Hitsch et 
al., 2010a; Ong & Wang, 2015), especially after childbirth (Wiswall & Zafar, 2018) and our hypothesis that this is due to the labor 
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𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + 𝛿(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤)𝑦𝑤) ≥ 𝑦𝑤 .   Eq.(2) 
Rearranging, we have the following necessary condition  𝑥𝑚 ≥ 1−𝛿𝑓(𝑛,𝑏𝑤)𝑏𝑤+𝛿 𝑦𝑤      Eq.(3) 
for marriage. ALM means that a woman would reject a man if his income is less than 
hers. A sufficient condition to prevent 𝑥𝑚 ≤ 𝑦𝑤 when Equation (3) holds is to require the 
coefficient 1−𝛿𝑓(𝑛,𝑏𝑤)𝑏𝑤+𝛿  for the pair to be larger than 1.5 
We incorporate this utility into a simple model based on a standard directed search 
framework and show how low-income women switching from surer matches with low-
income men to uncertain matches with high-income men, when the sex ratio and the value 
of marrying such high-income men increases, may crowd out high-income women from 
the marriage market. We model the competitive search between high- and low-income 
women for high-income men as the competition between two types of players: a high-
income woman (Column Player) and a low-income woman (Row Player) (see the game 
matrix in A-Table 1). We model the search choices of each player for 2 x 2 outcomes in 
this game in terms of whether to exert the extra effort cost necessary to potentially match 
with the high-income man: {(𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑇𝑟𝑦) ⁡×⁡ (𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑁𝑜⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡)}.6 The payoffs for 
the low-income woman are the first coordinates of each pair for each outcome as 
represented in the above matrix, whereas that of the high-income woman is the second.  
 
market opportunity costs of women’s childbearing. Gender identity can exacerbate the decline either alone (Bertrand et al., 2015) or 
interacted with women’s fertility (Jeon & Ong, 2018). 
5
 ALM means that a woman would reject a man if his income is less than hers. Here, we formulate the man’s incentive to reject a 
woman as a potential wife to show why men may not have an ALM for their wife’s income. The incentive of the man of income type 𝑚 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} who earns 𝑥𝑚, where 𝐿 represents low-income, and 𝐻 represents high-income, to be single or to marry a woman who 
earns 𝑦𝑤 and has beauty 𝑏𝑤 would be  𝑢𝑚 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥𝑚, 𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + (1 − 𝛿)(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤)𝑦𝑤)} .    Eq.(f1) 
We assume, as in women’s surplus function, a parallel complementarity between men’s income and women’s beauty/fertility 
expressed in 𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 in men’s surplus from marriage. This assumption is supported by our online dating finding that men’s preference 
for beautiful women increases with their income, i.e., they anticipate a higher surplus from more beautiful women. Similar to the 
choice of women, men may accept a woman who earns 𝑦𝑤 and has beauty 𝑏𝑤 if 𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + (1 − 𝛿)(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤)𝑦𝑤) ≥ 𝑥𝑚     Eq.(f2) 
For the empirical finding of a lack of ALM on the part of men to hold, it is sufficient that the beauty of the potential wife must 
compensate for her potential share of the husband’s income (𝑏𝑤 > 𝛿). In that case, he may accept her regardless of her income 𝑦𝑤 .⁡Otherwise, the wife’s income must compensate for the difference between the share of her share of his income⁡𝛿⁡and her beauty 
rank 𝑏𝑤 , discounted by his share of her after-marriage income (1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤): 𝑦𝑤 ≥ 𝛿−𝑏𝑤(1−𝛿)𝑓(𝑛,𝑏𝑤) 𝑥𝑚.      Eq.(f3) 
Equation f3 suggests a potential explanation for why men tend to ignore women’s reported or potential income in online dating 
studies (Neyt, Vandenbulcke, & Baert, 2019; Ong, 2016). Men and women tend to visit profiles that not only have a chance of making 
an acceptable match, but are also even more desirable than their own (Bruch & Newman, 2018). Therefore, if men focus on profiles 
with high facial beauty, then 𝑏𝑤 ⁡would tend to be greater than 𝛿.  
6
 Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) incorporate such entry costs into the equilibrium tradeoffs between the value and the probability of 
matching when they relate their work to prior literature.     
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To simplify our analysis of the equilibrium payoffs and avoid unnecessarily 
complicated algebra, we denote the payoff of a woman of income type 𝑤 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} 
marrying a man of income type 𝑚 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}  as 𝜃𝑤(𝑚) , where 𝜃𝑤(𝑚) = ⁡𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 +𝛿(𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑏𝑤)𝑦𝑤), based on Equation (3). Importantly, 𝜃𝑤(𝑚) increases on 𝑥𝑚; both 
types of women get greater surplus matching with the high-income man.  
 
A-TABLE 1: GAME MATRIX FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN HIGH- AND LOW-INCOME WOMEN FOR HIGH-INCOME MEN 
  
High-income woman (Plain-looking) 





𝑇𝑟𝑦 (𝑡) 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) – 𝑐𝑙, 𝑦ℎ 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 − 𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿)– 𝑐𝑙, 𝑧𝑦ℎ + (1⁡– ⁡𝑧)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) – 𝑐ℎ 𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑇𝑟𝑦⁡(1 − 𝑡) 𝜃𝑙(𝐿), 𝜃ℎ(𝐻)⁡ 𝜃𝑙(𝐿), 𝜃ℎ(𝐻)–⁡𝑐ℎ 
 
The low-income woman automatically “gets” the low-income man7 or she can 𝑇𝑟𝑦 for 
the high-income man who earns 𝑥𝐻. She values marriage to him at 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) minus her cost 
of effort (from searching or otherwise, e.g., putting more effort in grooming) 𝑐𝑙 ≥ 0. The 
high-income woman values the high-income man at 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) and can put in 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 at cost 𝑐ℎ ≥ 0 in getting him. We can write 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) = 𝑎 ∙ 𝜃𝑙(𝐻), where 𝑎⁡is a positive constant.8 
Hence, we need only specify variations in 𝜃𝑙(𝐻)⁡when we do comparative statics. To 
capture the greater frictions faced by the low-income woman in meeting a high-income 
man due to sorting by coeducational and market institutions, we assume that: 𝑐𝑙 > 𝑐ℎ ≥0.  
Starting from the outcome (𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝑁𝑜⁡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) in the lower left hand corner of A-
Table 1, if neither woman wants to compete for the high-income man, we assume that the 
high-income woman gets him. This last assumption adds to the lower friction (𝑐𝑙 > 𝑐ℎ) 
that the high-income woman enjoys in getting the high-income man, e.g., she is in the 
same coeducational institution or the same firm. Going to the diagonal outcomes 
(𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝑁𝑜⁡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) and (𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡), if one of the two women is competing to get 
 
7
 Recall that an estimated 30 million women are missing from the prime age marriage market. Low-income men are especially 
desperate given women’s preference for high-income men. Hence, women can presumably match with low-income men at low cost. 
8
 In any case, the precise value does not affect our results. 
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the high-income man and the other is not, the one who competes succeeds for sure, and 
the other gets the payoff of their next best option, as described next.  
On the top right of A-Table 1 is the outcome (𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡)  where both women 
compete for the high-income man. We capture the relative attractiveness of the low-
income woman as compared to the high-income woman to the high-income man with the 
variable 𝑧. 𝑧 represents the odds that the low-income woman gets the high-income man 
when she chooses Try and the high-income woman also chooses 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡. Though none 
of our qualitative results depend on the value of z, the greater beauty of the low-income 
woman implies 𝑧 > 12. Each woman gets her next best option when she fails to get the 
high-income man. For the low-income woman, this is the low-income man, who she then 
gets with probability (1 − 𝑧). For the high-income woman, this is her singlehood payoff 𝑦ℎ, which she gets with probability 𝑧.  
To simplify the payoffs, we normalize high-income woman’s income 𝑦ℎ = 0 from this 
point forward. We further assume 𝜃𝑤(𝐻) > 𝜃𝑤(𝐿) for both 𝑤 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ}, that is, getting the 
high-income man yields a higher payoff than getting the low-income man. Also, assume 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) − 𝑐𝑙 > 0, 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 − 𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿) − 𝑐𝑙 > 0⁡and⁡𝑧(1 − 𝑧)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − 𝑐ℎ > 0⁡so that 
the payoff in each case is non-negative.  
The two pure strategy equilibria are (𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝑁𝑜⁡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) , which occurs for low 
values of 𝜃𝑙(𝐻), and (𝑇𝑟𝑦, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡), which occurs for high values of 𝜃𝑙(𝐻). Relating 
these equilibria to the low-income woman crowding out the high-income woman, in the 
equilibrium in which the low-income woman chooses 𝑇𝑟𝑦, the value of the high-income 
man, 𝜃𝑙(𝐻), is high enough for the low-income woman to switch from a sure match with 
the low-income man (who she values at 𝜃𝑙(𝐿)) to an uncertain match with the high-
income man (who she values at 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) − 𝑐𝑙). This switch forces the high-income woman 
to compete for the high-income man and choose 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡. Her probability of getting him 
decreases from 1 to 1 − 𝑧, resulting in her being crowded out with probability 𝑧. The 
parameter values necessary and sufficient for these equilibria are summarized in A-Table 
2. 
Next, we look for the interior mixed strategy equilibrium. Let 𝑒 stand for the probability 
high-income woman chooses 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 and 𝑡 stand for the probability that the low-income 
woman chooses 𝑇𝑟𝑦. This equilibrium requires that the low-income woman is indifferent 
between 𝑇𝑟𝑦  and 𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑡𝑟𝑦 , given the high-income woman’s strategy, and the high-
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income woman is indifferent between 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡  and 𝑁𝑜⁡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 , given the low-income 
woman’s strategy. In other words, it requires (1 − 𝑒)(𝜃𝑙(𝐻) − 𝑐𝑙) + ⁡𝑒(𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 − 𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿) − 𝑐𝑙) = 𝜃𝑙(𝐿)  Eq.(4) 𝑡(𝑧 ∙ 0 + (1 − 𝑧)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − 𝑐ℎ) + (1 − 𝑡)(𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − 𝑐ℎ) = 𝑡 ∙ 0 + (1 − 𝑡)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) 
   Eq.(5) 
Solving the two equations gives us 𝑒 = 𝜃𝑙(𝐻)−𝜃𝑙(𝐿)−𝑐𝑙(1−𝑧)(𝜃𝑙(𝐻)−𝜃𝑙(𝐿))  and 𝑡 = 𝑐ℎ(1−𝑧)(𝜃ℎ(𝐻)) . The 
interior mixed strategy equilibrium requires 𝑒 and 𝑡 to be strictly between 0 and 1, which 
in turn requires 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙 < 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) < 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧  and 𝑐ℎ1−𝑧 <  𝜃ℎ(𝐻) . Plugging the 
equilibrium values of 𝑒 and 𝑡 back into the above equations, the payoff for the high- and 
low-income woman is 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − ⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡−⁡𝑧 and 𝜃𝑙(𝐿), respectively.  
In A-Table 2, if 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) is below 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙, then it is a dominant strategy for the low-
income woman to 𝑁𝑜𝑡⁡𝑡𝑟𝑦. The high-income woman’s payoff is 𝜃ℎ(𝐻). When the value 
of trying for the high-income man for the low-income woman, 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 −𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿)–⁡𝑐𝑙, rises above 𝜃𝑙(𝐿), the low-income woman chooses 𝑇𝑟𝑦 with strictly positive 
probability. In doing so, she switches her search target from the low-income man (who 
she can always get) to an uncertain match with the high-income man. This ‘competitive 
entry’ of the low-income woman forces the high-income woman to compete for the high-
income man by choosing 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡. The probability with which the low-income woman 
gets the high-income man rises from zero to 𝑧. Her payoff is still 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) since she is still 
indifferent in this mixed strategy equilibrium to her old payoff. The probability with 
which the high-income woman’s gets the high-income man decreases from 1 to 1 − 𝑧. 
Her payoff drops discontinuously from 𝜃ℎ(𝐻)  to 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − ⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡−⁡𝑧 . If 𝜃𝑙(𝐻)  increases 
further to above 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧 , the low-income woman tries with probability 1 (full entry), 
and high-income woman’s payoff again drops discontinuously, this time from 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) −⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡−⁡𝑧 to (1⁡– ⁡𝑧)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) – 𝑐ℎ .These equilibrium strategies and payoffs are detailed in A-
Table 2 and are further illustrated in A-Figure 5.  
We need only change the interpretation of this game slightly to model the effect of an 
increase in sex ratio in the directed search framework, where agents target their search 
based on expected utility. Let the two types of women now be two populations of 
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otherwise homogenous individual women, namely high- and low-income.9 We interpret 
the probability distribution of their equilibrium strategies as the share of each type of 
women adopting these strategies. We also interpret 𝑧, which previously represents the 
probability of one woman getting one high-income man, to now represent the share of 
high-income men that the low-income women population gets, given the shares of both 
the high- and the low-income women populations that put in 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡  or 𝑇𝑟𝑦 , 
respectively. The share of low-income women matching is 𝑧 ∙ 𝑠, where 𝑠 represents the 
sex ratio. The share of high-income women matching is (1 − 𝑧) ∙ 𝑠 . We can relabel 𝑧𝑙(𝑠) = 𝑧 ∙ 𝑠  and 𝑧ℎ(𝑠) = (1 − 𝑧) ∙ 𝑠 . When sex ratio increases from 𝑠  to 𝑠′ , the 
probability which enters into each type of woman’s expected value of searching for the 
high-income men would be 𝑧𝑙(𝑠′) , 𝑧𝑙(𝑠′) > 𝑧𝑙(𝑠),  and 𝑧𝑙(𝑠′),  𝑧ℎ(𝑠′) > 𝑧ℎ(𝑠),  rather 
than 𝑧𝑙(𝑠) and 𝑧ℎ(𝑠), respectively. Hence, given 𝑧𝑙(𝑠) and 𝑧ℎ(𝑠), the expected value of 
searching for high-income men is 𝑧𝑙(𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) = (𝑧 ∙ 𝑠) ∙ 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) = 𝑧 ∙ (𝑠 ∙ 𝜃𝑙(𝐻))  Eq.(6) 
for low-income women, and 𝑧ℎ(𝑠) ∙ 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) = ((1 − 𝑧) ∙ 𝑠) ∙ 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) = (1 − 𝑧) ∙ (𝑠 ∙ 𝜃ℎ(𝐻)) Eq.(7) 
for high-income women. When 𝑧𝑙(𝑠) and 𝑧ℎ(𝑠) increase with the sex ratio, the expected 
value of searching for high-income men also increases, just as if the value of matching 
with these men increases to⁡𝑠 ∙ 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) and 𝑠 ∙ 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) while the share of the high-income 
men each income type of women gets is fixed at 𝑧 and 1 − 𝑧. 
It is obvious that we would find similar results with an increase in 𝑠 that we find with 
an increase in 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) and 𝜃ℎ(𝐻). Hence, the effect of an increase in the sex ratio is similar 
to an increase in the income of high-income men because the expected value which 





 The probability with which individual players choose an action in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as shares 





A-TABLE 2: EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS FOR EACH TYPE OF WOMAN GIVEN Z AND 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) 
 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) < 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) <𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙  𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙 < 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) < 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧   𝜃𝑙(𝐻) > 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧   
h-woman    
e(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡) 0 𝜃𝑙(𝐻) − 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) − 𝑐𝑙(1 − 𝑧)(𝜃𝑙(𝐻) − 𝜃𝑙(𝐿)) 1 
payoff 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) 𝜃ℎ(𝐻) − ⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡−⁡𝑧  (1⁡– ⁡𝑧)𝜃ℎ(𝐻) – 𝑐ℎ 
l-woman    𝑡(𝑇𝑟𝑦) 0 𝑐ℎ(1⁡ − ⁡𝑧) ∙ 𝜃ℎ(𝐻)⁡ 1 
payoff 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 −𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿)– 𝑐𝑙  
Note: The top row details the probability of 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 for the high (h)-income woman and her payoff in equilibrium for a given values 
of 𝜃ℎ, and the bottom row details that of 𝑇𝑟𝑦 for the low (l)-income woman. 
 
A-FIGURE 5: STRATEGIES AND PAYOFFS FOR HIGH- AND LOW-INCOME WOMEN  
𝜃𝑙(𝐻)⁡ 
𝑒(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡)/𝑡(𝑇𝑟𝑦) 
𝜃𝑙(𝐿) 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙  𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧  
𝜃𝑙(𝐻)⁡ 
Payoff 
𝜃𝑙(𝐿) 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧  
1 
𝜃𝑙(𝐿) 
𝑎(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙) 
h-income woman 
l-income woman 
𝑐ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝑧)(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙) 
 
𝑎(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙) ⁡− ⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡ − ⁡𝑧 
 
𝑎(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧 ) − ⁡𝑐ℎ1⁡ − ⁡𝑧 
𝑎(1 − 𝑧)(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧 ) − 𝑐ℎ 
𝑐ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝑧)(𝜃𝑙(𝐿) + 𝑐𝑙𝑧 ) 
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Notes: We impose 𝜃ℎ(𝐿) = 𝑎𝜃𝑙(𝐿) for simplicity. z is the probability that the l-type woman gets the high-income man when both 
types of women search for him. The top panel illustrates the equilibrium strategy for the high (h)- and low (l)-income women, whereas 
the bottom panel illustrates their respective payoffs. The thin double-lines are those of the h-income woman. The thick green lines are 
those of the l-income woman. The low-income woman switches from her sure payoff with matching with the low-income man to her 
uncertain payoff by trying to match with the high-income man when 𝑧𝜃𝑙(𝐻) + (1 − 𝑧)𝜃𝑙(𝐿) − 𝑐𝑙 > 𝜃𝑙(𝐿) forcing the h-woman to 
compete for the high-income man. 
We now conduct a numerical simulation to illustrate that our results from the two 
income and beauty types case still hold for a continuum of income and beauty types.  
We simulate 1000 men and 1000 women. Men’s income 𝑥𝑚  follows a uniform 
distribution over [1.5, 2.5]. Women’s income 𝑦𝑤 follows a uniform distribution over [1, 
2], where we allow for a gender wage gap. Women’s beauty percentile 𝑏𝑤 is assumed to 
be independent of her income and we randomly assign 𝑏𝑤 from a uniform distribution 
over [0, 1]. When marrying a man with income 𝑥𝑚, the woman’s marital surplus is given 
by 𝑢𝑤(𝑥𝑚) = 0.25 + 0.5𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + 0.5(𝑥𝑚 + 0.5𝑦𝑤)   Eq.(8) 
which is assumed to be deterministic for simplicity. A woman’s value of being single is 
just her own income 𝑦𝑤. When married with a woman with (𝑦𝑤 , 𝑏𝑤), a man’s marital 
surplus is given by 𝑢𝑚(𝑦𝑤 , 𝑏𝑤) = 0.25 + 0.5𝑥𝑚𝑏𝑤 + 0.5(𝑥𝑚 + 0.5𝑦𝑤) + 𝜀𝑚  Eq.(9) 
where 𝜀𝑚 is an i.i.d. shock following the Type-I extreme value (TIEV) distribution. When 
there is a queue of women searching for a man, this TIEV shock term in men’s surplus 
gives us the man’s probability of choosing a particular woman (𝑦𝑤 , 𝑏𝑤) from the queue, 
which takes the convenient logit form: 𝑝𝑚(𝑦𝑤 , 𝑏𝑤) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑢𝑚(𝑦𝑤,𝑏𝑤))∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑢𝑚(𝑦′𝑤,𝑏′𝑤))𝑤     Eq.(10) 
where the denominator is the sum of the exponential of the man’s potential surplus when 
matched with each woman in the queue. Note that the probability of a woman being 
chosen from the queue equals her match probability with man m is 𝑝𝑤. Thus 𝑝𝑤(𝑥𝑚) = 𝑝𝑚(𝑦𝑤 , 𝑏𝑤)    Eq.(11) 
We assume the search cost of women decreases with the difference between the 
woman’s own income rank and the income rank of the man she searches for. We use 
income rank to capture the search costs from labor market segmentation. The search cost 𝑐𝑤 is given by 𝑐𝑤(𝑥𝑚) = 0.5 |𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑤(𝑦𝑤)−𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚(𝑥𝑚)|1000−1     Eq.(12) 
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where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑚(∙)  and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑤(∙)  are the income rank among men and women, 
respectively. The lowest income has a rank of 1, and the highest income has a rank of 
1000. This function yields a search cost range of [0, 0.5]. The choice of coefficient 0.5 is 
to make the search cost non-trivial such that women would not be able to search without 
limit across income groups. On the other hand, the search cost should not be too high to 
prevent any entry of low-income women into the market for high-income men even when 
these men are much richer or more plentiful. 
Given these elements, a woman’s expected value from searching for a man who earns 𝑥𝑚 is 𝑝𝑤(𝑥𝑚)𝑢𝑤(𝑥𝑚) − 𝑐𝑤(𝑥𝑚)    Eq.(13) 
In equilibrium, a woman chooses to search for a man to maximize her expected value, 
taking as given all other women’s searches. If the highest expected value from search is 
lower than the value of being single, she will not search and remain single. We simulate 
each woman’s search choice and iterate until convergence to the pure strategy equilibrium 
in this discrete choice search model.10  
The simulation starts with a default search: each woman searches for the man with the 
same income rank as hers at zero search cost. Thus, in this initial search, income is 
perfectly positively assortative. Again, this is to reflect the educational and labor market 
segmentations in real life. Taking the queue at each man in the default search as given, 
we solve the first woman’s maximization problem to decide which man she should search 
for. After the first woman adjusts her search, the second woman takes the updated queues 
as given and adjusts her search accordingly. We iterate this simulation until no woman 
has a profitable deviation from her last round’s search target and we reach the equilibrium. 
We simulate the equilibrium search targets and matching probabilities of different 
women and examine how they change with sex ratio or men’s income distribution. In the 
baseline setting, we simulate 1000 men and 1000 women (i.e., sex ratio = 1) and let men’s 
income follow a uniform distribution over [1.5, 2.5]. 
We first examine the effect of an increase in the sex ratio. We conduct three simulations, 
the baseline with sex ratio set at 1, another with sex ratio increased to 1.1, and third with 
sex ratio set at 1.2, all three keeping men’s income distribution fixed. A-Figure 6 
 
10
 Simulating mixed equilibrium strategies would be much more difficult since it requires solving and tracking the presumably 
continuous choice vector of search allocations of each woman’s search probability across all men. To keep the simulation of 
equilibrium trackable, we leave that for future work. 
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compares women’s search target in equilibrium between these simulations and the 
baseline. In A-Figure 6, we report the average income of the men searched by women 
(vertical axis) by their own income (horizontal axis) and beauty (bottom 1/3 in panel A, 
middle 1/3 in panel B, top 1/3 in panel C). Note that both women’s income and beauty 
are drawn from uniform distributions, but we divide women into three equal subgroups 
by beauty for easier presentation. The dotted line in each panel represents the baseline 
equilibrium where sex ratio is set at 1. As shown in the figure, women’s search is 
positively assortative on income in all three panels for this baseline case. The dashed and 
solid lines represent the equilibrium when sex ratio is 1.1 and 1.2, respectively.  
In the baseline (dotted lines), no woman, regardless of her beauty, deviates from the 
default assignment where each woman searches for the man with same income rank as 
herself. No woman switches in the baseline case because given our parametrization of the 
search cost, switching to searching for a higher-income man and competing with the 
woman who initially searches for that man would incur both a higher search cost and a 
lower match probability that would not be compensated for by the higher value of the 
new man.  
We next compare the search behavior of women when the sex ratio increases from 1 
(dotted baseline) to 1.1 (dashed line). Starting with panel C, which graphs the search 
behavior of beautiful women for whom the effect of sex ratio is most pronounced, we see 
that the left end of the dashed line shifts upward compared to the dotted baseline. This 
upward shift by the left end indicates that the average income of the men being searched 
for by these low-income women increases. This upward shift in the targeted men’s 
income is largest for the lowest-income women, because their initial matches have the 
lowest income. Thus, the opportunity cost for these low-income women (who give up a 
match with low-income men) in switching to searching for high-income men is the 
lowest.  
When the sex ratio increases further to 1.2 (solid line), the left end of the solid line in 
panel C shifts upwards even more significantly than the dashed line when the sex ratio 
was 1.1. Due to the complementarity between women’s beauty and men’s income in their 
marital surplus, beautiful low-income women most readily relinquish their initial match 




For higher income women (e.g., those whose income is above 1.25), the income of their 
initial matches in the baseline case (their opportunity cost) is also higher. Thus, competing 
for higher-income men yields a smaller gain in terms of men’s income and may entail a 
large decrease in match probability. For many of these higher income women, the switch 
to searching for even higher income men would generally result in a loss compared to 
staying with their initial sure match. Consequently, fewer of these women switch their 
searches to high-income men, and thus, the average income of men being searched (the 
vertical axis) is lower than that of the women with the lowest income levels.  
Graphically, this effect of higher opportunity costs of switching is shown in the 
magnitude of the gap between the dashed line and the dotted baseline decreasing and 
eventually disappearing as women’s income increases beyond 1.25.11 Moreover, we see 
that despite the competitive entry of beautiful low-income women, high-income women 
also do not deviate from their searches for high-income men to searching for low-income 
men (i.e., the graphs are never decreasing on the women’s income for high-income 
women), due to their aversion to marrying lower-income men.  
Moving right to left across panels in A-Figure 6, we see that in contrast to beautiful 
low-income women in panel C, low-income women of mid-1/3 (dashed line in panel B) 
and bottom-1/3 beauty (dashed line in panel A) increase their searches for high-income 
men less significantly as sex ratio increases. This less pronounced increase is because of 
their lower gain in marital surplus from their lower beauty. The increase in the expected 
surplus from the increase in the sex ratio is not enough to compensate for the higher search 
cost and lower match probability with high-income men from the increased competition 
for these men. As a consequence, the dashed line overlaps with the dotted baseline in 
panels A and B for women of all income levels except for the very lowest near 1. This 
high degree of overlap is in contrast to panel C, where a divergence in search behavior is 
evident for women facing different sex ratios above the income level of 1.25. As in Panel 
C, high-income women in panels A and B continue to search for high-income men until 
the expected value from marital search becomes lower than the value of being single 
rather than switch to searching for low-income men. 
 
11
 Note that we are less interested in the shape of any curve (e.g. the V-shape of the dashed and solid curves in Panel C), which is 
a comparison of women with different incomes cross-sectionally. Our focus is to examine the search strategy of any specific woman 
when the sex ratio increases, which is also the more appropriate way of interpreting the simulation results. Thus, essentially, we are 





A-FIGURE 6: SIMULATION OF SEX RATIO INCREASE: WOMEN’S EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH TARGET  
Notes: This figure compares the equilibrium in three simulations. First, we simulate 1000 men and 1000 women in the baseline (sex 
ratio = 1, represented by the dotted lines). Second, we increase the sex ratio to 1.1 (the dashed lines). Third, we increase the sex ratio 
to 1.2 (the solid lines). All other settings are the same: men’s income follows a uniform distribution over [1.5, 2.5]; women’s income 
follows a uniform distribution over [1, 2] and their beauty follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For easier presentation, we divide 
women into three equal subgroups by each third of beauty in each sub-figure. 
 
 
A-FIGURE 7: SIMULATION OF SEX RATIO INCREASE: WOMEN’S EQUILIBRIUM MATCH PROBABILITY 
Notes: This figure compares the equilibrium in three simulations. First, we simulate 1000 men and 1000 women in the baseline (sex 
ratio = 1, represented by the dotted lines). Second, we increase the sex ratio to 1.1 (the dashed lines). Third, we increase the sex ratio 
to 1.2 (the solid lines). All other settings are the same: men’s income follows a uniform distribution over [1.5, 2.5]; women’s income 
follows a uniform distribution over [1, 2] and their beauty follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. For easier presentation, we divide 
women into three equal subgroups by each third of beauty in each sub-figure. 
 
A-Figure 7 compares women’s marriage probability between the baseline sex ratio and 
two simulations with higher sex ratios. It reports women’s average match probability in 
equilibrium (vertical axis) by their own income (horizontal axis) and beauty (in panels A, 
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B and C). In the baseline case (dotted lines) when sex ratio is set at 1, given our 
parametrization, no woman has a sufficient incentive to deviate from her initial match. 
Thus, there is no competition among the women, and all the women match with 
probability 1 in all three panels.  
When the sex ratio increases to 1.1, the separation between the dashed lines and the 
dotted line in panels A and B shows the effect of beautiful low-income women’s entry 
into the high-income men submarket. There is no separation in panel C. The decrease in 
match probability of high-income women is most pronounced for plain-looking high-
income women because of the complementary between men’s income and women’s 
beauty in men’s marital surplus and because of women’s ALM. As a consequence of the 
complementarity of male income and female beauty in their surplus function, men will 
choose beautiful women with higher probability than plain-looking women when given a 
choice. Plain-looking high-income women, unlike plain-looking low-income women, do 
not substitute towards low-income men due to their binding ALM. They would rather 
resort to their singlehood outside option.  
As a result of both of the complementarity and ALM effects, the match probability of 
plain-looking high-income women (right end of the dashed line in panel A) drops 
compared to the baseline, while that of the medium-beauty high-income women (right 
end of the dashed line in panel B) and beautiful high-income women (right end of the 
dashed line in panel C) do not drop. For low-income women, whose ALM is not binding, 
their match probability is constant across all three beauty groups.  
When the sex ratio increases to 1.2 (solid lines), beautiful low-income women’s 
competitive entry is stronger. Consequently, the match probability of plain high-income 
women drops more substantially (right end of the solid line in panel A), which means 
more plain high-income women are crowded out from the marriage market. 
Next, we fix the sex ratio to 1 and conduct two additional simulations in which we 
increase men’s income. Compared to the baseline, the first additional simulation increases 
the upper bound of men’s income distribution from 2.5 to 2.75 and the second one further 
increases it to 3. We compare them with the baseline equilibrium in A-Figure 8 and A-
Figure 9.  
A-Figure 8 reports the average income of men being searched in equilibrium and A-
Figure 9 reports women’s match probability. The dotted line represents the baseline, and 
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the dashed and solid lines represent the simulation with men’s income distribution over 
[1.5, 2.75] and [1.5, 3], respectively. Again, women are divided into three subgroups by 
their beauty. 
 
A-FIGURE 8: SIMULATION OF MEN’S INCOME INCREASE: WOMEN’S EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH TARGET 
Notes: This figure compares the equilibrium in three simulations. First, we simulate 1000 men and 1000 women in the baseline where 
men’s income follows a uniform distribution of [1.5, 2.5] (represented by the dotted lines). Second, we increase men’s income  
distribution to [1.5, 2.75] (the dashed lines). Third, we increase men’s income distribution to [1.5, 3] (the solid lines). All other settings 
are the same: sex ratio is 1; women’s income follows a uniform distribution of [1, 2] and their beauty follows a uniform distribution 
of [0, 1]. For easier presentation, we divide women into three equal subgroups by each third of beauty in each sub-figure. 
 
 
A-FIGURE 9: SIMULATION OF MEN’S INCOME INCREASE: WOMEN’S EQUILIBRIUM MATCH PROBABILITY  
Notes: This figure compares the equilibrium in three simulations. First, we simulate 1000 men and 1000 women in the baseline where 
men’s income follows a uniform distribution of [1.5, 2.5] (represented by the dotted lines). Second, we increase men’s income  
distribution to [1.5, 2.75] (the dashed lines). Third, we increase men’s income distribution to [1.5, 3] (the solid lines). All other settings 
are the same: sex ratio is 1; women’s income follows a uniform distribution of [1, 2] and their beauty follows a uniform distribution 
of [0, 1]. For easier presentation, we divide women into three equal subgroups by each third of beauty in each sub-figure. 
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In A-Figure 8, when men’s income distribution is increased to [1.5, 2.75], the dashed 
lines in three panels all shift upwards, reflecting the fact that all women’s initial search 
targets become richer under the new income distribution. As with increases in the sex 
ratio, while plain (dashed line in panel A) and medium-beauty (dashed line in panel B) 
women’s searches are still positively assortative on income, beautiful low-income women 
(left end of the dashed line in panel C) give up their initial match of low-income men and 
switch their search target to richer men. Again, this is because, in the context of the 
complementarity between male income and female beauty, an increase in men’s income 
leads to the largest increase in surplus for the most beautiful women, so they are most 
willing to bear the higher search cost and lower match probability (compared to their 
original sure match) to compete for these men.  
Similar to the effect of an increase in the sex ratio, the upward shift of the search target’s 
income is largest for the lowest-income women in panel C, due to their lowest opportunity 
cost of giving up initial matches. When men’s income distribution is further increased to 
[1.5, 3] (solid lines), men at the top of the distribution are even more valuable. Beautiful 
low-income women’s entry (left end of the solid line in panel C) is stronger, as expected, 
compared to the dashed line, and even some medium-beauty low-income women (left end 
of the solid line in panel B) switch to search for richer men. 
Moving to A-Figure 9, as a result of beautiful low-income women’s strong entry into 
the submarket for rich men when men’s income distribution increases from [1.5, 2.5] to 
[1.5, 2.75], the match probability of plain high-income women (right end of the dashed 
line in panel A) drops considerably. In contrast, the match probability of beautiful low-
income women (left end of the dashed line in panel C) remains close to 1 after the entry, 
because rich men reciprocate more to beautiful women (due to the complementarity of 
male income and female beauty in the marital surplus). When men’s income distribution 
increases further to [1.5, 3] (solid lines), plain and medium-beauty high-income women 
are crowded out even more from the marriage market. This additional crowding-out is 
reflected in the sharper drop in the match probability in the right region of panels A and 
B. 
To sum up, the simulation with continuous income types for men and income and 
beauty types for women illustrates that, in the context of the directed search, when high-
income men are more plentiful or richer, plain high-income women may be crowded out 
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from the marriage market by the competitive entry of beautiful low-income women. This 
result is consistent with the result obtained from the 2 x 2 discrete type example discussed 
earlier. 
Appendix 4. Background on Cities and Visitors 
We started with 36 major cities (including all 31 provincial capitals and five vice-
provincial level cities). We excluded 10 cities in minority provinces, and Ningbo, which 
is very close to Shanghai and Hangzhou, and Shenzhen which is too close to Hong Kong 
and may be affected by the Hong Kong marriage market. We also excluded three cities 
between the ages of 20 and 29 years old and 25 and 34 years old sex ratios that differ by 
more than 5 percent. We, furthermore, excluded the six lowest GDP per capita cities, but 
kept Xi’an and Chengdu for geographic completeness. This selection process yielded the 
following list of 15 cities for the experiment. 






income per capita 
In 2013 
Sex ratio of 22-32 
men / 20-30 
women in 2010 
1 Tianjin 101689 32658 1.333 
2 Beijing 92210 40321 1.210 
3 Shanghai 90765 43851 1.180 
4 Guangzhou 120516 42066 1.166 
5 Xiamen 81572 41360 1.140 
6 Shenyang 88309 29074 1.114 
7 Nanjing 98171 39881 1.109 
8 Hangzhou 94791 39310 1.090 
9 Xi'an 57104 33100 1.078 
10 Qingdao 90746 35227 1.069 
11 Dalian 110600 30238 1.067 
12 Jinan 75254 35648 1.037 
13 Zhengzhou 68070 26615 1.031 
14 Changsha 99570 33662 1.012 
15 Chengdu 63476 29968 1.005 
Notes: GDP per capita and disposable income data are from the National Bureau of Statistics. The local sex ratio is defined 
as the number of males/number of females and derived from the 2010 Census. Excluding Tianjin, the variation we have 





A-TABLE 4: REGRESSION OF MEN’S MEAN INCOME ON LOCAL SEX RATIO WITH CITY-LEVEL DATA 
Dependent variable: Male mean income (in log) in a city 
 (1) (2) 
   
Sex ratio 0.183 0.167 
 (0.498) (0.508) 
Men’s income dispersion  2.041** 
  (0.965) 
Province dummies Y Y 
Constant 6.970*** 5.861*** 
 (0.036) (0.511) 
Observations 57 57 
R-squared 0.582 0.673 
Notes: Data are from the 2005 China mini-Census. The sample is restricted to males between the ages of 22-32 years and with an 
urban hukou and a positive income. It excluded provinces with significant minority populations and those for which we have less than 
300 observations for each of men and women. The local sex ratio is defined as the log of the number of males/number of females. Sex 
ratio, mean income, income dispersion, and population size are defined at the city-level. All incomes are in log form. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.  
A-TABLE 5: REGRESSION OF MEN’S INCOME DISPERSION ON LOCAL SEX RATIO WITH CITY LEVEL DATA 
Dependent variable: Men’s income standard deviation in a city 
 (1) (2) 
   
Sex ratio 0.008 -0.012 
 (0.132) (0.130) 
Men’s mean income  0.106** 
  (0.042) 
Province dummies Y Y 
Constant 0.544*** -0.197 
 (0.009) (0.293) 
Observations 57 57 
R-squared 0.448 0.568 
Notes: Data from the 2005 China mini-Census. The sample is restricted to males and females between the ages of 22 and 32 years old 
with an urban hukou and a positive income. It excludes provinces with significant minority populations and those for which we have 
less than 300 observations for each of men and women. The local sex ratio is defined as the log of the number of males/number of 
females. Sex ratio, income standard deviation, mean income, and population size are defined at the city-level. All incomes are in log 
form. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.  
A-TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF AGE, INCOME, AND EDUCATION FOR MALE VISITORS 
Male Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 5981 33.93 7.580 18 69 
Income (1k CNY) 5706 10.39 11.03 1 50 
Education (years) 5705 15.14 1.689 12 21 
Notes: Data are based on 5,981visits from men to 390 female profiles in another experiment conducted at the same time. 275 visits 
did not contain income information. Among these, one did not contain education information. This leaves us 5705 visits for our 
analysis. Female profiles are constructed as 22, 25, 28, 31, and 34 years old, all with a height of 163 cm, a college degree, and an 





A-TABLE 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF AGE, INCOME, AND EDUCATION FOR FEMALE VISITORS 
Women Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 1811 28.86 4.405 18 45 
Income (1k CNY) 1760 5.163 3.494 1 50 
Education (years) 1760 15.54 1.387 12 21 
Notes: Data are based on 1,811 visits from women to 450 male profiles in the experiment of this study. 51 visits did not contain income 
information. This leaves us 1760 visits for our analysis. Male profiles are constructed as 25, 28, 31, 34 and 37 years old, all with a 
height of 175 cm, a college degree, and an income of 3-5, 8-10, or 10-20 k CNY/month. They are all unmarried with no children and 




A-FIGURE 10: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN’S VISITS TO MALE PROFILES AND MEN’S VISITS TO FEMALE PROFILES 
Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of women visitors to our male profiles, whereas the right panel shows the distribution of 
men visitors to our female profiles. We group women’s visits into three income levels: <3, 3-5, and 5-20 (in 1k CNY), labelled as l-, 




Appendix 5. Instrumental Variable Robustness Check 
A-TABLE 8: THE FIRST STAGE REGRESSION FOR IV-ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION IN TABLES 2 AND 3 
Dependent variable: Sex ratio (log) 
 
For column (4) 
of Table 2 
For column (2) 
of Table 3 
 (1) (2) 
m-women dummy 
-0.086* 0.028 
 (0.050) (0.029) 
h-women dummy 
-0.055 0.049 
 (0.062) (0.036) 
Bartik sex ratio 0.917*** 1.263*** 
 (0.100) (0.063) 
Bartik sex ratio*m-women dummy 0.277** -0.056 
 (0.115) (0.047) 
Bartik sex ratio*h-women dummy 0.214 -0.069 
 (0.138) (0.050) 
Beauty ranking 
-0.191** -0.020 
 (0.075) (0.049) 
Beauty ranking*m-women dummy 0.144 -0.045 
 (0.092) (0.053) 
Beauty ranking*h-women dummy 0.069 -0.050 
 (0.111) (0.060) 
Bartik sex ratio*beauty ranking 0.492*** 0.008 
 (0.182) (0.105) 
Bartik sex ratio*beauty ranking*m-women dummy 
-0.475**  
 (0.216)  
Bartik sex ratio*beauty ranking*h-women dummy 
-0.312  
 (0.248)  
Mean income of H-men  0.022*** 
  (0.004) 
Mean income of H-men*beauty ranking  
-0.002 
  (0.007) 
Mean income of H-men*m-women dummy  0.006 
  (0.004) 
Mean income of H-men*beauty ranking*m-women dummy  
-0.013 
  (0.008) 
Mean income of H-men*h-women dummy  0.006 
  (0.006) 
Mean income of H-men*beauty ranking*h-women dummy  
-0.006  
  (0.010) 
Additional controls:    
Age and education dummies of female visitors Y Y 
Mean and standard deviation of men’s and women’s 
incomes in each city Y Y 
Constant 
-0.055 -0.058* 
 (0.042) (0.030) 
Observations 548 548 
F-statistic 115.4 167.3 
R2 0.866 0.936 
Notes: The local sex ratio is defined as the number of males between the ages of 22 and 32 years old over females between the ages 
of 20-30 years old at the time of experiment in 2014, proxied by males between the ages of 18 and 28 years old and females between 
the ages of 16 and 26 years old in the 2010 Census. The l-women are the omitted benchmark with income less than 3k CNY/month. 
m-women dummy = 1 if the woman’s income is between 3k and 8k CNY/month. Additional control variables are the same as those in 
Tables 2 and 3. Robust standard errors clustered at the city-level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
 
